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Abstract 
In this study, I examine several theories of ethics in technical communication. In 
doing so, I rely primarily on research in technical, professional, and business 
communication. In particular, I follow the lead of Mike Markel by separating ethical 
theories into two categories: foundational and nonfoundational.  
I examine three popular manifestations of foundational ethical theories in 
technical communication: universal values (such as honesty), utilitarianism, and Kantian 
ethics. I show how technical communication appropriates each theory but also how these 
theories can be problematic if communicators rely too heavily and exclusively upon 
them.  
Next, I explore two important nonfoundational theories in technical 
communication: dialogic ethics and professional ethics. Again, I illustrate how these 
theories apply to technical communication, but, again, I find that it can be dangerous to 
use solely these theories.  
Finally, I look to Mike Markel to find an ethical theory that integrates both 
foundational and nonfoundational ethics. I term this ethic contextual foundational. I 
explain how this ethic would function in technical communication and also how it could 
help mitigate some of the problems that arise in relying too exclusively on either 
foundational or nonfoundational ethics. I use examples from the Challenger disaster to 
illustrate how this contextual foundational ethic might benefit technical communicators. 
  
iii
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter One: Introduction _______________________________________________ 1 
A Definition of Technical Communication ______________________________________ 1 
A Definition of Ethics________________________________________________________ 8 
Chapter Two: Review of the Literature _____________________________________ 12 
The Social Contingency of Communication ____________________________________ 12 
Foundational Ethical Theories _______________________________________________ 30 
Nonfoundational Ethical Theories ____________________________________________ 33 
Chapter Three: Foundational Ethics ______________________________________ 39 
Universal Values __________________________________________________________ 42 
Utilitarianism _____________________________________________________________ 48 
Kantian Ethics ____________________________________________________________ 55 
Problems with Foundational Ethical Theories __________________________________ 59 
The Need for Nonfoundational Considerations in Foundational Ethics______________ 69 
Chapter Four: Nonfoundational Ethics ____________________________________ 70 
Dialogic Ethics ____________________________________________________________ 76 
Professional Ethics_________________________________________________________ 85 
Problems with Nonfoundational Ethical Theories _______________________________ 94 
  
iv
 
The Need for Foundational Considerations in Nonfoundational Ethics_____________ 102 
Chapter Five: Contextual Foundational Ethics _____________________________ 103 
Markel’s (Contextual Foundational) Ethic ____________________________________ 104 
Examining Contextual Foundational Ethics ___________________________________ 109 
Alleviating Nonfoundational Ethics’ Lack of Emphasis on the Individual __________ 113 
Alleviating Foundational Ethics’ Over-reliance on the Individual _________________ 120 
Alleviating Foundational Ethics’ Dependence on Ends __________________________ 125 
Alleviating Nonfoundational Ethics’ Impracticality_____________________________ 132 
Conclusion ______________________________________________________________ 140 
Bibliography _________________________________________________________ 142 
Vita ________________________________________________________________ 165 
 
 
  
1
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
What does it mean to be ethical—to be “good” or “bad”? What actions are “right” 
or “wrong,” “just” or “unjust”? From at least the time of Socrates, humankind has 
struggled with these questions. Answering them is difficult, especially in modern society 
when they deal with technology. How do we ensure that our technology and our 
communications about that technology are ethical? Some critics maintain that ethics is 
moot in the realms of science or theoretical technology, where “the facts speak for 
themselves.” However, others view technical fields such as engineering, biology, and 
technical communication through a humanistic lens and thus find them open to ethical 
judgments.  
The purpose of my thesis is to determine two things: why issues of ethics are 
applicable to technical communication, and what common ethical principles or 
frameworks guide the field. Then, I apply those principles to technical communication, 
noting both their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, I propose a combination of 
approaches that could benefit technical communicators.  
 
A Definition of Technical Communication 
Understanding the applicability of ethics to technical communication first 
demands a consensus in defining “technical communication.” Many critics have tried to 
negotiate a definition, a difficult task in a field whose boundaries are constantly changing 
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(i.e., Grossberg; Jones; Hayman; VanDeWeghe; Marder; Kelley and Masse). One of the 
most influential early definitions is given by Robert Hays. Hays describes technical 
communication in terms of its distinctions from nontechnical communication. According 
to him, technical communication is “more conservative, more the slave of the rule” than 
nontechnical writing, and technical communicators must “write correctly” in “an attitude 
of utter seriousness” (4). He further explains that since “the appropriate attitude is one of 
objectivity (if humanly possible), respect for data and their limitations, and 
caution,…technical style demands a specialized vocabulary, especially in its adjectives 
and nouns” (5). According to Hays, technical communication should attempt to do justice 
to technical—or, rather, technological—subject matter via precise, objective language. 
(See also Walter 28-30.) Accordingly, Hays labels technical communicators as 
grammarians who also “[can] record data and manipulate formulas, and have skill in 
constructing graphs” (8).  
To give statistical validity to this theory of technical communication as 
correctness and objectivity, Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr. mathematically calculates a 
redefinition of the field. He does so by comparing the stylistic features of “good” 
technical writing and “good” nontechnical writing. He looks at characteristics such as 
total words and paragraphs per communication, sentence length, numbers of words and 
sentences per paragraph, and frequency of sentence types (simple, complex, compound, 
and compound/complex). Dandridge concludes, “technical writing is, generally speaking, 
less complex stylistically—and therefore probably more direct—than nontechnical, 
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nonfiction material” (20). However, even Dandridge admits that his data does not 
support his hypothesis convincingly and that his sample (ten pieces each of technical and 
nontechnical material) is inadequate. Because it is inconclusive and does not help delimit 
the field, his statistical analyses of technical communication also fall short. Moreover, 
this general focus on correctness is troublesome when it prescribes forms and styles 
without giving “the idea of the thing—the job[s they are] designed to do” (Marder 83). 
By focusing on particulars rather than “organizing principles” (83-84), it unnecessarily 
limits both the function and scope of technical communication. 
As the field of technical communication has become more prominent, this 
definition, with its stress on grammatical correctness, has become too narrow. In 
response, other scholars have developed their own definitions. For example, W. Earl 
Britton suggests defining technical communication according to its purpose: precision of 
meaning. He supports his claim by stating that “the primary, though certainly not the 
sole, characteristic of technical and scientific writing lies in the effort of the author to 
convey one meaning and only one meaning in what he says” (11). To achieve this, he 
advocates objectivity and detachment (i.e., passive voice and third person), which can 
enable a technical message to “mean only what was intended” (12). However, it is 
difficult to accept Britton’s assumption that technical writing can “convey precisely and 
economically a single meaning” through objectivity (12). In fact, some of the most 
seemingly objective writing—such as computer manuals and recall notices—can be the 
most difficult for lay audiences to understand. As other scholars point out, detachment 
  
4
 
does not necessarily correspond with understanding, and clarity and concision alone do 
not define technical communication (Allen 11).  
Grappling with such problems, later scholarship has often defined technical 
communication in terms of its tasks, its genres, and its characteristics. For example, Fred 
H. MacIntosh sees technical writing as “the sort of spoken and written language required 
for the world’s work” (25), which he exemplifies in terms of tasks and genres. Among 
other things, he holds that technical communication serves primarily “to present factual 
information clearly and concisely; to describe items, equipment, systems, processes, 
procedures; [and] to make a sound, factual, logical case for a viewpoint” (25). To do so, it 
generally takes the following forms:  
letters, short memoranda, longer memoranda, short reports, long formal 
reports, information sheets, prospectuses, abstracts, digests, summaries, 
analyses, studies, profiles, manuals, bulletins, highlights, directives, 
guidelines, job descriptions, performance evaluations, briefs, position 
statements, public information releases, proposals, feasibility studies, progress 
reports, audit reports, fiscal reports, scripts for large-audience oral and media 
presentations, discussion guides for small-conference groups, and so forth. 25 
This method of defining through genres and tasks is hardly unique to MacIntosh. 
In fact, it survives and is proliferated by modern professional organizations for technical 
communicators (“IEEE”; Yanez; TC@MTU; Wright). Cataloguing of genres, though, 
tends to exclude practically nothing. When Britton’s list of forms is combined with his 
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purposes of technical writing, such as “to plan and write for oral presentation” (25), any 
writing for any purpose (including presentations from students in academic settings) 
becomes “technical writing.” Even though MacIntosh later limits his definition to writing 
that “look[s] outward, to concentrate upon what his reader needs or wants” (28), his 
definition still encompasses most writing for most purposes—technical or nontechnical. 
Such broad definitions are accommodating because they omit nothing that perhaps should 
be included, but they are impractical because they omit nothing that perhaps should be 
omitted.  
David Dobrin tackles some of these issues, suggesting that researchers define 
technical communication by looking at both the texts and the process of creating those 
texts. Dobrin offers a new definition: “Technical writing is writing that accommodates 
technology to the user” (“What’s Technical” 242). Dobrin argues that his definition more 
accurately reflects what technical writing is. For example, technical communication does 
not objectively relate information; rather, it accommodates (or translates) information to 
another person. Furthermore, Dobrin’s domain of technical communication is not 
distressingly all-inclusive. Instead, it is limited to technology, the application of science 
to human existence, which is implicit in many disciplines (i.e., law, history, management) 
(246-47). (See also “About STC” and “IEEE.”) Finally, says Dobrin, technical 
communication does not prescribe the stylistic or grammatical structures to which 
communicators must adhere. Instead, it is a process of knowing the audience and 
understanding its needs. Armed with this knowledge, technical communication employs 
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various rhetorical tools, which may or may not include features such as passive voice or 
fewer sentences per paragraph.  
Dobrin’s definition also specifies technical communication as a communication to 
a user, implying that technical communication travels from someone who knows about a 
situation or a product to someone who does not. According to Dobrin, technical 
communication is hardly limited to this particular path; for example, it can consist of an 
interchange among experts, all of whom are familiar with the subject matter. However, as 
Dobrin suggests, technical communication is frequently perceived as communication 
from an expert to a non-expert.  
Jeanne Fahnestock refines Dobrin’s distinction, explaining that communication 
among experts does not always necessitate the accommodation of information, one of the 
basic goals of technical communication. Because experts often have the same or similar 
points of reference, their communications focus primarily on “establishing the validity 
of… observations” rather than on accommodating information (278). She continues,  
[S]cientific accommodations [to non-experts] are overwhelmingly 
epideictic… [T]hey must usually be explicit in their claims about the value of 
the… discoveries they pass along. They cannot rely on the audience to 
recognize the significance of information. Thus, the work of epideictic 
rhetoric in science [and technical communication] requires the adjustment of 
new information to the audience’s already held values and assumptions. 278-
79 
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As Fahnestock illustrates, this act of accommodating information is more integral—and 
more ethically sensitive—in communication from an expert to a non-expert, making it a 
helpful distinction for a study of ethics in technical communication.  
Other scholars expand Dobrin’s definition in one important sense: whereas 
Dobrin limits technical communication to discourse about technology, they view 
technical communication as including communication about any “particular art, science, 
discipline or trade” that “helps the audience approach [the] subjects” (Stratton 39). 
Broadening the focus of the definition so that it is no longer deals only with “technical” 
subject matter focuses on “what the writing does (a focus that… lead[s] to an active 
definition)” (Allen 11, emphasis added). This more comprehensive definition 
acknowledges that not all writing about technology is “technical writing” (Allen). 
Moreover, rather than the focus being on the subject matter, it is on the purposes, 
processes, and goals of technical writing. With this in mind, John A. Walter expands the 
definition “to include almost any discipline and the writing about it that has as its purpose 
the conveying of… information for a specific purpose” (28). This expansion also allows 
for a better variety of the types of communication with which technical communicators 
actually work. For example, a communicator who creates directions for assembling pre-
fabricated furniture would not be a technical communicator by a definition that limits the 
field to communications about technology.  
Furthermore, these definitions concentrate on technical communication as a 
process (as well as a product). Doing so exposes the need for the technical communicator 
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to negotiate and implement a “creativity of diverse resources for various… effects” 
(Beck 51), illustrating that technical communicators do not simply apply rules and forms 
but actively analyze situations and information, accommodating them to different 
audiences. Therefore, I use a combination of these approaches to define technical 
communication in the following way: Technical communication is the process and 
product of communication—written, visual, multimedia, etc.—from an expert to a non-
expert. It is designed, both in form and content, to accommodate the understanding and 
tasks of the non-expert.  
 
A Definition of Ethics 
Having established a functional definition of “technical communication,” I must 
now define “ethics.” (Here, ethics is interchangeable with “morals” and “morality.”) This 
term, though, is even more elusive than the term “technical communication” because the 
study of ethics is ancient and variegated. Because ethics is such a multifaceted term, it 
would be impossible to attempt to thoroughly define it. Therefore, I offer only a brief 
summary of the role of ethics in technical communication; I leave a more comprehensive 
(but nonetheless incomplete) explanation of ethics for the body of my thesis. 
Although technical communicators define ethics in varying ways, most agree with 
the general description given by Louis P. Pojman, author of the comprehensive book on 
ethics entitled Ethical Theory,  
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Ethics, or moral philosophy as it is sometimes called, is the systematic 
endeavor to understand moral concepts and justify moral principles and 
theories. It undertakes to analyze such concepts as “right,” “wrong,” 
“permissible,” “ought,” “good,” and “evil” in their moral contexts. It builds 
and scrutinizes arguments setting forth large-scale theories on how we ought 
to act, and it seeks to discover valid principles (for example, never kill 
innocent human beings) and the relationship between those principles (for 
example, does saving a life in some situations constitute a valid reason for 
breaking a promise?)…. [E]thics is concerned with values—not what is, but 
what ought to be…. [It] has a distinct action-guiding aspect…. 1-2 
Based upon Pojman’s terminology, ethics is both the study and the application of 
ideas of “right” and “wrong,” of “should” or “shouldn’t.” Thus, there are two primary 
processes in ethics: discovering what actions ought to be engaged in, and participating in 
those actions. In the field of technical communication, this definition is also popular. 
Carolyn Rude, for instance, defines ethics as “[a set of] values [that] anticipate[s] the 
consequences of actions and help[s] people make judgments in particular cases” (362). 
These definitions are particularly useful because they show that the bases for ethical 
decisions are values. We can argue two things, though: what are these values, and what is 
their source? Pojman responds, “Moral theories differ on the scope of morality…, and 
they differ on the exact hierarchy of values…, but in general they have in common a 
concern to alleviate suffering and promote well-being” (2). In other words, some values 
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are universal. Rude goes one step further, though: “[some] bases for ethical choice 
derive from cultural values and values that are defined by the particular profession” 
(362). Other values, then, are culturally or professionally driven. To help communicators 
navigate in these areas, Herbert Michaelson places ethics in the middle ground between 
personal and professional responsibilities: “[ethics is determined in] the rather subtle 
conflict between an author’s self-interest and the obligation to provide adequate 
information for readers” (58). As each of these examples shows, regardless of its origin, 
ethics is the study and application of humanitarian values. It is, as Lori Allen and Dan 
Voss claim, “doing what is right to achieve what is good” (5, emphasis in original). 
With such a broad concept, which appears to be integrally woven into any activity 
and even humanity itself, many researchers are advising technical communicators to 
consider their own weighty ethical responsibility. Since, as Paul Dombrowski states, 
“each of us is an ethical decision maker…,” each technical communicator must realize 
that no “one can take his place and face for him the unique particulars of his ethical 
circumstances. In this sense, he must become his own ethical expert and authority” 
(Ethics 5). If each technical communicator must become an expert on ethics, one would 
think that every aspect of the subject would have been treated exhaustively. However, 
Arthur E. Walzer proclaims that “with few exceptions… [ethical] debate has so far 
tended to move too cavalierly from exhortation on the importance of ethics to a 
consideration of particular examples, without due consideration of the mediating 
questions concerning the motives, purposes, goals, and efficacy of ethics and of ethics 
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codes” (“Positivists” 105). Similarly, David Dobrin argues for a closer look at the 
moral grounds of technical communication (“What’s the Purpose”), and Dennis E. Minor 
admonishes that more attention to ethics is necessary for more responsible technical 
communicators and for a better education of future communicators (440). Thus, many of 
the most prestigious names in technical communication research agree that we must pay 
more attention to ethics. It is not enough to counsel communicators “to be ethical” and 
then to give them examples of ethical and unethical behavior. Rather, we need to explore 
the bases of ethics in the field: What is the “right” that we should do, and what is the 
“good” for which we should strive?  
These questions are the ones that I address. For my purposes, ethics is, indeed, 
“doing what is right to achieve what is good.” What exactly that “right” and “good” are is 
a complex matter, though. To uncover a theory of ethics in technical communication, I 
first show that ethics is integral to the field, dismissing many theories claiming that ethics 
is outside the realm of technical communication. Then, I introduce several of the most 
prominent ethical theories in the field, showing how they can help (or hinder) the 
proliferation of ethical communication. Finally, I attempt to paste together different 
ethical theories in such a way as to help reduce the problems with the individual theories, 
bolstering the theory that each communicator must become her own “ethical expert and 
authority.” 
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Chapter Two: Review of the Literature 
The Social Contingency of Communication 
In a study on ethics in technical communication, the first questions are “Is ethics 
truly a concern in communications about supposedly empirical subjects such as science 
and technology?” and “If so, how?” These questions date back at least to Aristotle, who 
advocated excluding ethics from logic (science and technology). Aristotle proclaimed 
that this logical or certain knowledge is absolute and should be transmitted as objectively 
as possible. Consequently, such objectivity does not involve value judgments, that is, 
ethics. Instead, ethics is relegated to the realm of uncertain knowledge: “Rhetoric for 
Aristotle deals only with what we do not know with certainty such as opinions, beliefs, 
and likelihood. Science, on the other hand, deals with knowledge that is true and certain. 
No one debates whether an apple falls downward or upward” (Dombrowski, Ethics 19). 
(See also VanDeWeghe 64-65 and Rubens, “Technical” 3-4.) For Aristotle and his 
adherents, communication about science and technology is exempt from ethical concerns.  
In the 17th century, the Royal Society of London further widened the gap between 
science and technology and ethics by mandating that the “plain style” be used in writing 
about science. This style “decried rhetorical excesses and prescribed neutral, objective 
style as the proper method for reporting results of scientific experiments” (Sanders, 
“How” 57). This position has helped lead communicators to believe that science is 
immune from subjective human concerns, including ethics.  
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In modern society, this split of ethics from science and technology is still 
evident and has profoundly influenced technical communication. This objective, ethics-
free approach to language is what Carolyn R. Miller calls “the windowpane theory” of 
language: it assumes that language can objectively convey objective reality 
(“Humanistic”). Related to logical positivism, the correspondence theory of truth, and the 
objective ideal of language, the windowpane theory here is an umbrella term that covers 
all of these supposedly objective uses of language. The windowpane theory assumes that 
a view of the world exists independently of human imagination and thought, and it calls 
for language to transmit that view clearly—as through a windowpane. (See also Hagge.) 
However, this philosophy fails to admit that a view of the world necessarily involves 
human interaction because it is a view, an interpretation. Furthermore, the windowpane 
theory is extremely troubling because it excludes ethics from technical communication.  
The windowpane theory of language. Many modern scholars view technical 
writing as a service field whose only purpose is to transmit information objectively. 
Although prevalent for centuries, this view of scientific and technical communication has 
been pronounced powerfully in the last 25 years, especially after critics (such as Carolyn 
Miller) began to question the objectivity of technical communication. One of the most 
influential declarations of the windowpane theory of language is Elizabeth Tebeaux’s 
1980 article, “Let’s Not Ruin Technical Writing, Too.” In it, she asserts, “the primary 
goal of the basic technical writing course [is] to teach students to document information 
clearly, correctly, and economically” (822). (Admittedly, other critics asserted this 
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position before Tebeaux, for example, Mitchell (1976) and Kelley and Masse (1977). 
However, Tebeaux is cited more frequently than are most earlier critics as one of the 
primary proponents of the windowpane theory.) Tebeaux implies that, indeed, 
information can be transmitted entirely clearly and objectively. In fact, she cites this 
supposedly objective skill as the technical communicator’s primary responsibility. 
Tebeaux continues, “The position that technical writing should be taught against a 
background of communality and enculturation makes technical writing just another 
English course and ignores the reason students take the course—to prepare for the writing 
they will have to do in business and industry” (822). As Tebeaux sees it, the role of the 
technical writing instructor is to increase the usability of not only the communication but 
also the communicator. The communicator is technology’s functionary; she is rewarded 
with success—money and promotions: “Trying to give [technical communication] 
‘intellectual depth’… or give [it] ethical dimensions… makes less sense than telling 
[communicators] that their paychecks are going to suffer if they can’t write well” (823). 
Questions of value, of right and wrong, are outside the communicator’s scope.  
Tebeaux defends her position by asserting, “[technical communication’s] reason 
for being… is not humanistic but pragmatic” (824), a distinction that other scholars both 
before and after her make as well. In 1973, prior to Tebeaux’s statement, Barbara Cox 
and Charles Roland argued that “[rhetoric] involves value judgments and not scientific 
evaluation, and as such concerns social and not scientific issues” (140). Cox and Roland 
implicitly deny that science is social and involves social (and ethical) issues. More than 
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20 years later, Patrick Moore followed their lead, insisting that technical 
communication is not rhetorical. Instead, he claims it is instrumental (pragmatic), a 
distinction that limits the ethical dimension of the field. (See also Hagge.) Moore urges 
technical communicators to explore the helpful instrumental qualities of communication, 
which he defines “in contrast to rhetorical uses of language” as those whose purposes are 
to produce results without prompting additional reasoning or supporting logic (103). 
Despite admitting that “technical communication is not objective,” he advocates just 
that—objectivity—by pleading for the exclusion of rhetoric so that “critics [do not] 
deprive students of the sharp, pragmatic tools that they will need to work with others (and 
sometimes control others)” (114). Flattening out (derhetoricizing) language can itself be 
humanistic, Moore asserts, such as in cases where unambiguous language enables a 
doctor to perform a surgery correctly to save a patient’s life. However, Moore fails to 
note that even such supposed “objectivity” is rhetorical in itself; it is a means of 
persuading that doctor to function in a given manner. If all language is thus rhetorical, 
contrary to what the windowpane theory proposes, then technical communicators must be 
more overtly aware of how their language depends upon social factors. Therefore, they 
must understand that their communication involves issues of ethics. 
Perhaps most distressingly, though, this humanistic-rhetorical/pragmatic 
distinction implies that ethics is not only not a concern but also unnecessary. Tebeaux 
states, “there simply is no time in a basic technical writing course to devote to ethics and 
inapplicable rhetorical theory” (825). According to Tebeaux, any curriculum or task 
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whose purpose is primarily pragmatic is, by its pragmatic nature, not humanistic; its 
practicality exempts it from human issues. Moreover, even if technical communication 
courses should include issues of ethics, there would be no time for such superfluous 
humanistic concerns. (See also Evans.) 
Admittedly, some proponents of the windowpane theory acknowledge ethics as a 
concern in technical communication. However, most agree with John Hagge, addressing 
ethics within a windowpane-theory framework by equating it with objectivity: “the one 
overriding ethical imperative in STW [scientific and technical writing], then, is being true 
to the facts” (472). In a windowpane view of language, ethics in technical communication 
functions only to further objectivity. Nevertheless, even this seemingly simple 
admonition is not helpful. If the author of a computer user manual is simply “true to the 
facts,” providing her readers with her entire set of data, she inundates the reader and 
ceases to be helpful. In fact, one of the primary responsibilities of the technical 
communicator is to select the most helpful facts for her audience and to determine how to 
present those facts so that the reader understands their importance (Orbell; LaRoche). For 
example, few critics argue that the engineers of the space shuttle Challenger were false to 
the facts of the situation (the danger of the charring O-rings); the disaster occurred 
because some communicators failed to present information in such a way that the 
audience was persuaded to see the charring of the O-rings as a significant fact 
(Dombrowski, “Challenger” and “Can Ethics”; Moore, “When Politeness”; Walzer, 
“Positivists”; Winsor). Therefore, highlighting information is an important aspect of the 
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technical communicator’s job. Moreover, it is a rhetorical—a persuasive—function. As 
such, it forces the communicator to ask herself “What is best?” and “How do I do what is 
best?”—ethical questions that are denied if the communicator sees her mission entirely in 
instrumental, nonrhetorical terms. 
Kenneth Burke’s objection to the windowpane theory of language. The 
windowpane theory of language has been contested widely, especially by literary critic 
Kenneth Burke. Burke argues that all communication is socially contingent because it “is 
a translation, and every translation is an act of compromise” (Counter-Statement 54), in 
part because it is contingent upon the social resources available for the communication 
(Blankenship et al 82). More specifically to science, Burke concludes, “no matter how 
much a matter of purely empirical observation …[a scientific experiment] may seem to 
be, it actually is a very distinct choice of circumference [subjective points of reference] 
for the placement of human motives” (Grammar 78). Objectivity is impossible, then, 
because human motives and points of reference can never coincide exactly with another 
person’s since no two humans’ experiences are identical (Counter-Statement 179 and 
Philosophy 90).  
Moreover, simply by naming things and situations, humans imply an attitude and, 
therefore, a course of action toward them (Philosophy 294 and Grammar 415; 
Blankenship et al 84; Gregg 123). For example, labeling a place as “home” connotes 
attitudes and anticipatory actions toward it. Those attitudes and actions necessarily 
change from person to person based upon different connotations of the word. Burke by 
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no means denies the existence of objective reality. Instead, in some of the most prolific 
work on the subject in modern rhetoric, Burke recognizes that the words used to refer to 
objective reality are not objective; they do not, in themselves, constitute a full reality. In 
short, he notes that language inherently involves humanistic concerns and 
subjectivities—including ethics. Furthermore, Burke’s theory of the subjectivity of 
language paves the way for later scholarship in technical communication and is the basis 
for much research in language (i.e., Chesebro and LaRoche). Modern theory reverberates 
with Burke’s thought:  
The rhetorical view of science does not deny “the brute facts of nature”; it 
merely affirms that these “facts,” whatever they are, are not science itself, 
knowledge itself. Whatever they are, the “brute facts” themselves mean 
nothing; only statements mean, and of the truth of statements we must be 
persuaded. These processes… are essentially rhetorical. Gross 170 
The contextualist theory of language: Carolyn Miller. In rhetoric, composition, 
and technical communication, the most powerful denunciation of the windowpane theory 
of language came in 1979 in Carolyn R. Miller’s landmark essay “A Humanistic 
Rationale for Technical Writing.” In it, Miller exposes the nonrhetorical view of science 
and technology as “a form of intellectual coercion [that] invites us to prostrate ourselves 
at the windowpane of language and accept what Science has demonstrated” (613). 
Instead, she advocates what is popularly called the contextualist theory of language. 
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Miller dismisses the windowpane theory of language on many bases. She 
deduces, “Facts do not exist independently, waiting to be found and collected and 
systematized; facts are human constructions which presuppose theories…. Truth, or the 
knowledge for which science seeks, is … the correspondence of ideas, not to the material 
world, but to other people’s ideas…. Science is, through and through, a rhetorical 
endeavor” (“Humanist” 615-16). “Objectivity” is what mankind agrees it is, and 
consensus is persuasive persuasion: “Good technical writing becomes, rather than the 
revelation of absolute reality, a persuasive version of experience” (616). Furthermore, 
even if technical subject matter could be transmitted objectively, we first would have to 
define the field of technical communication, a task that has evaded scholars. “Reality,” 
Miller illustrates, “doesn’t come in packages marked ‘technical’ or ‘nontechnical.’ But 
perhaps any aspect of reality might be treated in a technical or nontechnical manner” 
(613). We cannot grant rhetorical immunity to a field whose boundaries are 
imperceptible.  
Next, the windowpane theory of language forces technical communicators to 
focus on recipes for style, readability, objectivity, and audience analysis because it 
assumes that these features can make the windowpane sufficiently transparent. Such 
assumptions reduce technical writing to a cookbook of “correct” ingredients and 
proportions that must produce effective technical communication. However, objectivity 
alone does not automatically lead to usability. Scott Sanders explains, “Rhetoric defined 
as the clear exposition of facts alone… is often not effective enough to ensure the 
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reader’s understanding, much less the reader’s assent and subsequent action” (“How” 
56, emphasis added). Miller later elaborates that writing is not only a set of skills but also 
a means of understanding and interpreting meaning, tasks that cannot be objectified and 
learned by rote. Moreover, the windowpane theory reduces writing to a set of instructions 
to be followed without question. By denying writer and reader of the rights to question 
motives and demand justification for practices, the windowpane theory dehumanizes both 
parties. It alienates reader from writer and both from their purposes and goals, fostering 
the idea that humanity is not involved in technical communication. Instead, Miller 
concludes that technical communicators need not a set of skills that will lead to monetary 
success but an awareness of the rhetoric implicit in their fields. They can employ this 
knowledge in a humanitarian way, by not only using it to their advantage but also 
changing it when necessary (“Comment”). 
Perhaps Miller’s most sobering realization is that the windowpane theory can be 
dangerous as well as infeasible and irresponsible. If communicators choose one 
interpretation as “objective,” they privilege the ideology implicit in that interpretation as 
the absolute truth, an act that is ethically frightening. She concludes,  
To write, to engage in any communication, is to participate in a community; to 
write well is to understand the conditions of one’s own participation—the 
concepts, values, traditions, and style which permit identification with that 
community and determine the success or failure of communication. Our 
teaching of writing should present mechanical rules and skills against a 
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broader understanding of why and how to adjust or violate the rules, of the 
social implications of the roles a writer casts for himself or herself and for the 
reader, and of the ethical repercussions of one’s words. “Humanistic” 617 
She comments on this idea again in later writing, stating, “objectivity is a particular 
socially constructed version of reality that can serve a rhetorical purpose” (“Comment”). 
Thus, communicators must understand the contextual nature and the rhetorical purpose of 
their discourse:  
In some cases…the tendency to read instrumental documents…as in fact 
referring to an objective reality accounts for why some people accept as 
absolutely “real,” “true,” and “good” what are actually the socially 
constructed versions of reality that such documents project. For this reason…I 
think [communicators need to understand the] ethical implications of the texts 
they produce as well as their purposes for producing them. “Comments” 
By regarding communication as interpretation, Miller demonstrates that technical 
communication involves making decisions about values. And questions of values are 
questions of ethics.  
The contextualist theory of language: Other scholars. A wealth of scholars 
have followed Miller’s lead or enjoyed renewed popularity following her statement. They 
stress the contextual nature of language and the inevitable inclusion of rhetoric (and 
ethics) in technical communication. Philip Rubens illustrates this position: “As soon as a 
human being intervenes in an experimental environment as an observer in relation to 
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subject and quantifying apparatus, objectivity ceases” (18). Objectivity is lost when the 
scientist or technician interacts with her subjects; it is twice removed when the 
communicator subjectively relates the technician’s subjective interpretation. Dr. William 
J. Winslade, Ph.D., J.D. acknowledges another contextual aspect of language, explaining 
that even science has its “politics, its schools of thought, its fads and enthusiasm, and in 
this respect does not differ from other forms of human activity” (60). As a result, even 
science must admit that its processes are ideological, social, and subjective. In fact, since 
human reason alone is inconclusive, rhetorical invention can actually guide practical 
knowledge (John Angus Campbell 295). Consequently, communication theories must be 
grounded in practical conditions and local perspectives. (See also Westmoreland; 
Zappen.) 
Paul M. Dombrowski delimits the contextualist theory even more, calling it the 
theory of “social contingency” (“Challenger” 99-100). He agrees that a concrete, 
empirical world does exist, but he admits that “the ‘objects’ of our communications are 
oftentimes not material objects and raw data but the socially contingent meanings, 
interpretations, and significances attached to material objects” (99). Regardless of the 
empirical phenomena language is meant to symbolize, social contingency declares that to 
an extent, our society and culture determine our interpretations of (or beliefs in and 
about) phenomena and our attitudes (and actions) toward them. Moreover, Dombrowski 
suggests that social contingency “includes unwitting and passive considerations [of 
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language]” (100). Thus, humanity does not always consciously construct meaning; 
often, we arrive at it subconsciously. 
After tracing the emergence of many similar arguments, Ronald Arnett concludes 
that the bulk of modern scholarship argues that “communication or rhetoric… is needed 
to actualize the ‘humane’ knowledge or the ‘ultimate Idea of Good” (49). In other words, 
reality does not necessarily depend upon human interpretation, but its actualization—its 
relevance to humanity—depends upon human interaction (Campbell, Paul; Scott; Freed; 
Clark, “Professional Ethics”; Goldbort; Zerbe, Young, and Nagelhout 43-61; Halloran; 
Marder; Lunsford; Dobrin, “Is Technical Writing”; Berlin, “Rhetoric and Ideology”; 
Sanders, “How”; Parsons). Moreover, that actualization involves selecting which realities 
to privilege, and matters of selection are matters of ethics. 
The inevitable contextualism of language is not undesirable, though; in fact, it is 
just the opposite. For example, Mary LaRoche concludes that technical communicators 
fail to be responsible if they are not subjective and persuasive. She explains, “the 
technical writer who presents information is really establishing the significance of that 
information by choosing a context for it” (65). Many audiences of technical writing 
want—and often need—communicators to make recommendations. Failing to do so can 
be frustrating for users, especially when communicators resort to ambiguity and 
“factoids” to avoid suggestions (Allison). This unwillingness to recommend actions or 
products can actually be irresponsible on the communicator’s part. Brenda Orbell 
concurs, demonstrating how in certain technical genres (namely report writing), technical 
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communicators must make suggestions. Although this idea seems entirely contrary to 
the democratic exchange of information that technical communication should foster, it is 
democratic; it is a process in which all communicators engage. Even writers of computer 
manuals enlist in a version of this suggestion-giving when they prioritize information and 
tasks, and offer explanations and trouble-shooting options. However, in such a view, 
ethics obviously becomes increasingly important as communicators struggle to decide 
which information is (or should be) of importance to their audiences and how (or if) to 
present that information. Therefore, as the social contingency of language becomes 
increasingly accepted, ethics emerges as a matter of greater and greater import. 
In fact, other scholarship proves that failing to make these determinations of value 
can be dangerous. For example, communicators often employ strategies such as passive 
voice and nominalizations to make their messages appear objective. However, these 
tactics can falsely imply that humans were not and are not involved in the subject matter, 
making the matter seem disconnected from humanity. In short, “objective” maneuvers 
can dehumanize the subject matter and decrease responsibility by making the 
communication seem inevitable and not the result of human action (Killingsworth 88-89; 
Rubens 17-18). This danger was tragically exposed in the Challenger disaster, when 
engineers declined to explicitly recommend against the shuttle’s take-off, suggesting that 
this objective, scientific matter did not need subjective, human intervention 
(Dombrowski, “Can Ethics,” “Lessons,” and “Challenger and the Social Contingency”; 
Moore, “When Politeness”; Walzer, “Positivists”; Winsor).  
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There is another serious ethical danger in failing to understand language as 
contextual: making technology omnipotent. Kenneth Burke warns, “develop neutrality in 
the vocabulary of the physical sciences (including technology) while leaving prejudice in 
the vocabulary of social relations, and technology as a power becomes an ominous 
power” (Philosophy 151). If communicators privilege technical communication as 
truthful and whole, they make it a sovereign power, beyond human control. (See also 
Westmoreland.) David Dobrin resolves, “The stipulation of objectivity as a form of 
technical writing is merely another way of coopting the authority of science” (“What’s 
Technical” 232). Conceding the unlimited authority of technology presents a moral 
dilemma: “[the objective ideal of language] fosters… the notion that one may 
comprehensively discuss human and social events in a nonmoral vocabulary, and that 
perception itself is a nonmoral act” (Burke, Philosophy 164). Therefore, communicators 
must acknowledge the contextual nature of communication and realize that their 
subjective choices are responsible or irresponsible, ethical or unethical (Schroll). 
The radical social constructionist theory of language. The contextual theory of 
language is increasingly accepted in technical communication. However, scholars 
disagree as to its pervasiveness. In fact, some theorists have made the contextual nature 
of language the foundation for not only communication but also reality, a theory called 
social constructionism. Like the sophists of ancient Greece, the social constructionists 
hold that man himself creates (not just interprets) reality. From its standpoint of cultural 
relativism, social constructionism presumes that the social forces at action in any given 
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situation create knowledge and reality. As a result, communication itself determines 
not only what is “right” and “wrong” but also what is “true” and “false” (Dombrowski, 
Ethics 21-24; see also Carolyn Miller, “Rhetoric and Community” 81). Through 
language, the individual learns society’s attitudes toward her and constructs herself 
according to those attitudes. It is not just identity, though, that society creates; social 
constructionism holds that society creates truth itself. “Truth,” one such scholar 
concludes, “is agreement” (Brummett, qtd. in Miller, “Rhetoric and Community” 84; see 
also Ben-Chaim).  
In this radical theory of social constructionism, ethics is indeed a concern. 
However, in social constructionism, since reality and values are constraints of the 
communicator herself (albeit, in negotiation with an audience), ethics is concerned less 
with making decisions about values than with persuasively creating values. Miller warns 
of the repercussions of this liberal social constructionist attitude; namely, it can actually 
promote “disaffection” (an increase in consensus but a decrease in human sympathy), 
make “the good” impossible to define, and fragment society (“Rhetoric and Community” 
84-91).  
Moreover, when all truth and good become entirely socially constructed, ethics 
becomes merely a subset of social cohesion. Gregory Clark, for instance, is problematic 
when he states, “communication engages people in cooperative interactions with others 
which constitute momentary, temporary, or enduring communities, and [it is] my belief 
that consent to so cooperate despite differences and conflicts is the act that constitutes 
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and maintains that community ethically” (“Professional Ethics” 33). According to him, 
ethics is social unity, but Clark does not specify what that social unity should be used for 
or even if it is desirable. For example, Kenneth Burke explains that Hitler authored one of 
the most convincing rhetorics of modern times, creating unparalleled social unity 
(Grammar). If we unquestioningly accept Clark’s equation of ethicality with unity, even 
Hitler’s rapport would be ethical. Obviously, it was not. Social constructionism 
surrenders matters of right and wrong to society, disallowing many other considerations 
and making it less suitable for a discussion of ethics than the more moderate contextualist 
theory.  
The need for ethics in the contextualist theory of language. Many scholars 
explicate the increasing role of ethics in technical communication because of the 
contextual nature of language. Paul Dombrowski claims that a false belief in the 
objectivity of technical communication leads communicators to assume “that instituting 
additional impersonal procedures can substitute for personal ethical responsibility and 
prevent ethical lapses” (147). He calls this problem the “technologizing of ethics” (“Can 
Ethics”). In response, communicators must realize that ethics is inherent in technical 
communication but that it is complex, not a matter that procedures and style guides can 
completely resolve. Steven Katz agrees because “Technical writing, perhaps even more 
than other kinds of rhetorical discourse, always leads to action, and thus always impacts 
on human life; in technical writing, epistemology necessarily leads to ethics” (259). The 
increased likelihood of action, then, also increases the responsibility of the writer. Katz 
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later states that if “ethics are culturally relative, we must realize the role rhetoric plays 
in continually creating, recreating, and maintaining not only knowledge, but values as 
well” (271). Clearly, the ethical responsibility of the technical communicator is great. 
In total, the works I have reviewed here show that technical communicators can 
no longer believe that their job is to transparently deliver absolute facts. Instead, they 
must realize that knowledge depends upon social factors at least to an extent. That 
contingency—as well as the translucent rather than transparent nature of language—gives 
rise to questions of right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust: questions of ethics. 
 
Ethics in the Socially Contingent Communication of Science and 
Technology 
 
An overview. If communication and language depend upon human interpretation 
at least to some degree, that is, if language is contextual in nature, then communication 
involves values and, thus, ethics. As Paul Dombrowski states, “Because human 
communication is always about values and always rhetorical at some level, we should 
strive to be conscious of the ethical values communicated through the rhetoric of our 
discourse” (Ethics 13). This contextual view of communication raises many ethical 
questions for the field: How do we interpret phenomena “ethically”? Whose standards of 
ethics should we use? Are we responsible for how others use the technology about which 
we write? What is our role in the ethical-decision-making process? (Ethics).  
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To help researchers answer these questions, Paul Dombrowski reviews and 
categorizes twenty-five years’ worth of research on ethics and technical communication 
in three works: “Ethics and Technical Communication: The Past Quarter Century,” Ethics 
in Technical Communication, and Humanistic Aspects of Technical Communication. In 
this final work, Dombrowski presents several contextual issues in the field and 
representative essays. The chapter on ethics presents three ethical standards that technical 
communicators can use: nature (ethics based on the laws of nature), conformance to good 
(accepted) practices (ethics based on sound, accepted standards and procedures), and 
codes of conduct (ethics based on “rules” established by the field) (181-87).  
Foundational and Nonfoundational Distinctions. Although Dombrowski’s 
categorizations are useful, Mike Markel makes a more general and interesting 
classification in his 1997 essay, “Ethics and Technical Communication: A Case for 
Foundational Approaches.” Markel, one of the most prolific writers on the ethics of 
technical communication, notes two primary ethical perspectives. The first is the 
foundational approach. It is associated with the modern and classical traditions and is 
grounded in certain principles (i.e., utilitarianism and the Golden Rule). He explains, 
“implicit in all foundational theories is the premise that if you can determine the relevant 
facts in the case, you can apply the theory to determine the appropriate course of action. 
Foundational theories are therefore deductive, top-down approaches to ethics” (286). The 
second approach is nonfoundational. It is related to postmodernism, and in it, ethics has 
no fixed meaning but is “culturally and historically determined” (284) (i.e., 
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communicative or discourse ethics and postmodern ethics). Nonfoundational theories 
“[change] the focus from the individual’s thought processes to the process of open and 
free discourse among all interested parties…. [They make] no claims about the rightness 
or wrongness of particular actions or ideas; rather, [they comment] only on the nature of 
the discourse itself” (287). Markel then demonstrates the shortcomings of both 
approaches, establishing that neither foundational nor nonfoundational ethics is useful 
when applied without the other. Instead, he advocates (as do I) the need for a 
combination of approaches.  
 
Foundational Ethical Theories 
Of the various foundational theories, I examine three. Like Markel, I review the 
two most popular ones: utilitarianism and the Golden Rule as illustrated in Kant’s 
categorical imperative. However, I first explore approaches that found ethics in a set of 
universal values.  
Universal Values. Some critics attempt to identify foundational values to which 
communicators should adhere when facing ethical problems. The most modern, 
comprehensive treatment comes from Lori Allen and Dan Voss’s Ethics in Technical 
Communication, which cites ten such values: honesty, legality, privacy, quality, 
teamwork, avoiding conflict of interest, cultural sensitivity, social responsibility, 
professional growth, and advancing the profession. Allen and Voss claim to have 
analyzed various situations in which technical communicators must make value calls, or 
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decisions of ethics. Based on those examinations, they propose these ten values as vital 
to all human existence; in other words, these values represent the most essential “good” 
to which humans collectively strive (15-46). They are indeed, personal matters but 
supposedly are ratified unanimously by technical communicators (18-19). 
Communicators apply these values by imposing a value analysis on ethical conflicts:  
1. Define the issue and identify the stakeholders. 
2. Determine the stakeholders’ interests. 
3. Identify the relevant values that bear on the issue. 
4. Determine the values and interests that are in conflict. 
5. Apply a model to rank values according to importance, to weight the 
values and interests that are in conflict [because no one value is consistently 
more important than the others].  
6. Resolve the conflict in favor of the higher (more important) value. 20-21, 
emphasis in original 
However convincing, though, Allen and Voss’s attempt to negotiate the gray area 
of ethics is problematic in some aspects. First, one of their bases for their selection of 
values is their own insight into “what is right” (17), which they find in “a combination of 
personal integrity and social values” (18). Such a personal, subjective approach is 
inadequate for defining all or even the primary ethical standards for all technical 
communicators. Any attempt to reduce ethical obligations to a set of ten words must 
necessarily be incomplete.  
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Utilitarianism. Other foundational theories present methods of analysis (rather 
than sets of values) as ethical bases. The theory of utilitarianism holds that actions are 
ethical when they produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. When 
technical communicators apply utilitarianism, they ask themselves, “What information 
will help the most people and hurt the fewest?” and “How can I present it so that it helps 
the most people and hurts or alienates the fewest?” Several scholars apply utilitarian 
ethics (Schroll; Allen and Voss; Zerbe, Young, and Nagelhout).  
Still, this approach has its drawback. It fails to provide a basis for “goodness” and 
“helping.” Is a result good if it provides comfort, or must it help mankind in some greater 
way? Are some forms of good nobler than others? (I.e., is pleasure a greater good than 
comfort?) Second, utilitarianism focuses on the products of decision-making rather than 
the processes; it prompts technical communicators to ask the question “How can the end 
result benefit as many people as possible?” at the expense of the question “How—or 
will—the process of achieving this result benefit as many people as possible?” By 
privileging the ends over the means, utilitarianism can sanction unethical activities that 
nonetheless produce some form of goodness or comfort in the end, a sanction that easily 
could be abused. 
Kantian Ethics. Another popular foundational ethic is Kant’s categorical 
imperative; it focuses more on the process of deliberation inherent in ethical decision-
making rather than on the product. The categorical imperative has two primary 
commandments: at all times, act only in such a way that you should wish your actions to 
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become universal laws, and always treat other humans as ends in themselves rather 
than as means to ends. Along with many other critics, Mike Markel argues that the 
categorical imperative is an ideal method of ethical deliberation (“Ethical Imperative”). 
Granted, “Kant’s [theory] surely is no ethical panacea. Sometimes, any action a technical 
communicator takes will sacrifice someone’s human dignity…” (85). Kantian ethics also 
risks being self-serving. The communicator herself chooses actions that she would want 
universalized, making this ethic inherently individualistic and subjective. Still, this theory 
forces the communicator to place her actions along a broader spectrum, understanding 
their relevance and repercussions outside herself. It also forces her to involve the 
audience in her ethical-decision-making, a task that many other foundational approaches 
neglect.  
 
Nonfoundational Ethical Theories 
As Markel explains, there are two primary nonfoundational ethical theories: 
communicative and postmodern ethics. Because these two approaches are so similar, 
though, I combine them under the heading of dialogic ethics: theories concerned with 
creating values via a dialogue within the community. Then, I explore how technical 
communication has narrowed down these theories into professional ethics, which can 
lead to ethics of expediency.  
Dialogic Ethics. Many theorists advocate a dialogic approach to ethics, one in 
which ethics is based on consensus. This approach is dialogic because it is achieved via a 
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dialogue among community members. One of the first and most illustrative examples 
of this viewpoint is Richard L. Johannesen in Ethics in Human Communication: 
Dialogical perspectives for evaluating communication ethics focus on the 
attitudes toward each other held by the participants in a communication 
transaction. Participant attitudes are viewed as an index of the ethical level of 
that communication. The assumption is that some attitudes (characteristic of 
dialogue) are more fully human, humane, and facilitative of self-fulfillment 
than are other attitudes (characteristic of monologue). Dialogical attitudes are 
held to best nurture and actualize each individual’s capacities and potentials 
whatever they are. The techniques and presentation of a communication 
participant could be scrutinized to determine the degree to which they reveal 
ethical dialogical attitudes or unethical monological attitudes toward other 
participant. 43, emphasis in original.  
In this dialogic process, ethics is a function of how honestly and intensely the 
communicators (both writers and readers) show respect and responsibility to one another. 
An ethical dialogue is characterized by genuineness, empathic understanding, 
unconditional positive regard, presentness, a spirit of mutual equality, and a supportive 
psychological climate (45-46). Using the dialogic approach, a communicator can help 
resolve conflicts between goals by prioritizing purposes and actions based on the current 
situation and then satisfying those goals (51-56). However, this approach can be 
dangerous if communicators take it to the extreme, if they sacrifice honesty or 
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responsibility for the sake of consensus or harmony (Miller, “Rhetoric and 
Community” and Burke, Grammar).  
Professional Ethics or Expediency. However, some technical communication 
scholars have reduced the dialogic community to include only other technical 
communicators. This professional ethic claims that morality is whatever the current 
professional tenor decides it is. In particular, dialogic professional ethics looks to codes 
of conduct to describe socially-determined, accepted (and hence ethical) industry 
practices. One of the most frequently cited statements on professional ethics is Gregory 
Clark’s “Professional Ethics from an Academic Perspective.” Clark claims that ethics is 
consensus to cooperate; professionally, then, ethics is a consensus among professionals. 
In another important proclamation on this ethic, Frank Radez elaborates: “[The 
professional ethic] involves the quality of our work, the results of our professionalism in 
practice. Ultimately, our characteristic methods and materials result from the 
communicator’s ethics. The communicator’s ethic [also] must exemplify the values and 
practices of conduct which will further the spirit of cooperation and accomplishment in 
corporate publishing” (5). Both of these men suggest reducing the dialogic community 
strictly to professional writers. As a result, the consensus necessary for nonfoundational 
ethics now lies solely among technical communicators. However, if communicators find 
that their only ethical responsibilities are what they, as professionals, deem them to be, 
they can easily manipulate those responsibilities to serve only themselves. Doing so 
violates the very spirit of nonfoundational ethics.  
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Moreover, the professional ethic leads to what Steven Katz terms the “ethic of 
expediency.” The ethic of expediency equates generally accepted standard practices with 
ethicality. In short, when ethics is determined by like-minded professionals, it becomes a 
matter of adherence to certain practices and standards, such as clarity and use of active 
voice. Because, as Clark states, “the communication ethics that prevails in our civic 
culture is one that values first and foremost the authority of expertise” (34), this ethic is 
seductive. It is dangerous, however, because it eliminates from the communicator any 
responsibility to parties outside of her profession and excuses her from ethical 
deliberation apart from adherence to textbook techniques. 
Contextual-Foundational Ethical Theories 
Although many researchers advocate only foundational or only nonfoundational 
perspectives, others prefer what I call a contextual-foundational approach to ethics: the 
belief that ethics may have foundational bases but is also contextual because it is 
contingent upon social interpretation and interaction. The most eloquent defender of this 
position is Mike Markel (“Ethics”). He resolves, “My approach is to consider issues that 
derive from foundational ethical approaches, but to carry out the decision-making process 
within a communicative [nonfoundational] framework” (293). In this fluid process, the 
communicator begins by analyzing a situation in terms of either “Kantian rights [or] 
utility” (295). These approaches are not formulas for doing what is ethical, but they allow 
the communicator to understand the situation and its repercussions more fully. They help 
her determine the most ethical course of action. Next, through a give-and-take discussion 
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with those involved, allowing for a reasonably honest perception of the situation and of 
the options practically available, the communicator determines whether or not she can 
implement the most ethical course of action. She then acts in the most ethically 
responsible way that her individual situation will allow her to. This framework does not 
deny the presence of foundational ethics, but it does help the communicator decide if her 
chosen action is feasible and, if not, what other actions are (295). As Markel concludes, 
“the best [approach to ethics] lies somewhere between radical foundational theories, 
which know everything, and radical postmodern theories, which know nothing” (295).  
 
Conclusion 
 Unquestionably, ethics is an important topic in technical communication. The 
contextual-foundational approach is especially interesting. First, it avoids placing the 
communicator in a vacuum, a problem inherent in most foundational approaches. If ethics 
is contextual, the communicator is responsible to those around her. Although this 
framework by no means excludes personal or even instinctive universal values, it requires 
the communicator to consider the values and concerns of others. Such consideration is 
essential since technology and science affect not only the communicator but also society 
at large. Second, this ethical framework escapes the entirely relativistic, nonfoundational 
view of ethics. In contextual-foundational ethics, the technical communicator has a very 
important responsibility to initiate negotiation, a responsibility much less defined in 
nonfoundational ethics with its emphasis on creating values rather than uncovering them. 
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Perhaps more importantly, this ethical standard opens the door to certain foundational 
beliefs (i.e., human life should be preserved) that society may interpret differently but 
that are nonetheless primary. Sophistic, nonfoundational ethics denies that any values 
exist unless an audience is persuaded to accept or create them. Therefore, ethics as 
contextual and foundational most fully takes into consideration the communicator’s 
responsibilities to her subject matter, herself, and her audience. 
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Chapter Three: Foundational Ethics 
 Ideally, foundational ethics is universal; it provides a precept to which everyone 
in every situation should adhere. Earl Winkler explains foundational ethics as “a single, 
comprehensive, and coherent theory that is based in universal, basic principles, which, in 
their turn, yield particular principles and rules that are capable of deciding concrete issues 
of practice” (qtd. in Markel, “A Case” 286, emphasis added). Regardless of the situation, 
foundational ethics provides a useful guide because different circumstances do not alter 
foundational ethics. Instead, foundational ethics itself determines the “particular 
principles and rules” for the individual circumstances. The principles inform the 
situations; the situations manifest but do not alter the universal principles.  
This universal applicability gives foundational ethics its power, even in technical 
communication. For example, Cindy Williams uses the universal principles of 
utilitarianism and Kantian ethics to examine Intel’s unethical behavior following a 
problem with its Pentium chip. Because both of these ethical approaches are universal, 
Williams can apply them to Intel’s Pentium chip crisis just as effectively as any other 
communicator could implement them in any other situation. (See also Markel, “An 
Ethical.”) James Porter utilizes another foundational ethical approach—the primacy of 
truth (“Truth”). In any situation, truth is the technical advertiser’s primary ethical 
obligation. In each of these instances, the ethical solution is foundational and supposedly 
universal. That is, it is equally applicable to and successful in every ethical dilemma 
because it prescribes behavior for particular situations.  
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Granted, most proponents of foundational ethics admit that it is inadequate 
alone; even universal standards are subject to negotiation. For instance, although Louis 
Perica advocates truth as an unchanging universal precept for the technical 
communicator, he acknowledges that “the technical communicator who pursues ethical 
standards disregarded by his associates is simply asking for trouble” (6). In short, the 
communicator cannot disregard the ethics of those around her. If ethics depends to some 
degree on others, then it is somewhat relative and socially contingent. However, this 
contextual feature is contrary to foundational ethics, which claims that one ethical basis 
will always work in every situation regardless of the other social forces at work in that 
situation. Thus, Perica admits that foundational ethical bases are not entirely universal 
and unchanging, and that ethics has a contextual (or nonfoundational) aspect.  
However, Perica does not expand on these nonfoundational aspects of ethics. 
Instead, he reverts to the necessity of the universal axiom of truth, concluding that the 
communicator should follow his own sense of the universal application of honesty. “To 
thine own self be true,” he declares, because in that adage lies the “answer to one’s 
individual approach to truth in technical communication” (6). As Perica exemplifies, 
even though proponents of foundational ethics concede social contingency, too often they 
simply mention that contingency and then return to exhorting the importance of 
mastering universal, foundational ethics. By doing so, these scholars can lead technical 
communicators to assume that if they can master one value or ethical system, their 
communication will be ethical. From Perica, for example, the technical communicator 
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might discern that being “truthful” is the ultimate—perhaps the only—ethical goal. 
Honesty is not the only ethical standard, though, and learning to write truthfully does not 
guarantee ethical—or effective—technical communication. Therefore, if ethics in 
technical communication is somewhat contextual, researchers must fully address the 
corresponding nonfoundational aspects of ethics. If they do not, they can lead 
communicators to believe falsely that mastering foundational ethical tenets will always 
produce ethical communication.  
In this chapter, I examine three foundational ethical systems, showing how each 
functions in technical communication. I also reveal how these theories can be dangerous 
if they give only lip service to nonfoundational ethics, without completely addressing and 
explaining the contextual aspects of ethics in technical communication. I do not attempt 
to prove that all foundational ethical systems are seriously flawed or that they entirely 
ignore nonfoundational ethics. I also do not intend to imply that these foundational 
ethical approaches are substandard or unethical. Rather, I simply illustrate that there are 
problems with foundational theories that slight the nonfoundational aspects of ethics. I 
then conclude by depicting some of the drawbacks that could arise if technical 
communicators continue to overlook nonfoundational ethics and rely too heavily on 
foundational ethics  
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Universal Values 
 Like Allen and Voss’s list of ten foundational moral characteristics, most ethical 
philosophies based on universal values prescribe certain qualities with supposedly 
inherent ethical worth. Modern technical communication scholarship mandates numerous 
such values, but the most popular virtue by far is truth or honesty (Buchholz; Michaelson; 
Perica; Porter, “Truth”; Riley). Allen and Voss, for example, advocate honesty, which 
they define as  
Making one’s best effort to provide truthful, clear, and accurate 
communication…. [I]t means neither falsifying, omitting, nor slanting 
information with the intent to deceive the audience, and not allowing [others] 
to do so. In other words, communicating honestly means more than telling the 
truth and more than not telling a lie. It demands a genuine commitment to 
convey the message to the audience in the most forthright, comprehensible 
manner possible. “Ethics for Editors” 62-63 
Honesty, then, would seem to be a relatively simple matter. The primary ethical 
question we must ask is “How might the communicator be truthful and clear?” To 
achieve these ends, James Porter proposes accuracy, which he associates with readability. 
For Porter, readability becomes a measure of the ultimate ethical goal: truth. Specifically, 
he advocates readability formulas, which he claims “generate an exact and fairly reliable 
readability score” (186). Despite admitting that many communicators distrust readability 
formulas, Porter uses them to evaluate samples of technical communication. His samples 
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score poorly on the readability tests, so they indicate a poor standard of truth and 
ethicality. For Porter, lucidity is the tool through which communicators portray their 
truthfulness. All readable writing may not be true, but all truthful writing must be 
readable.  
In advocating honesty or truth as a primary ethical value, Herbert Michaelson 
takes a different approach. He lists several breaches of this truthfulness, warning 
communicators not to fall prey to them: “sins of omission” (i.e., failing to communicate 
defects or give appropriate authorial credit), unfair bias (i.e., inappropriately cropping 
photographs), ambiguity and speculation (i.e., using citations that are unavailable to the 
public), plagiarism, and indiscriminate publication (i.e., submitting under-developed 
ideas for publication). Similarly, Louis Perica notes that using statistics inappropriately 
and deliberately failing to organize in order to mislead the reader both violate standards 
of honesty and hence ethical responsibility (4). To maintain honesty, he urges each 
technical communicator to find the “the answer to one’s individual approach to truth in 
technical communication” (6, emphasis added). In another search for honesty in technical 
communication, Robert Cowen promotes careful fact- and ego-checking to avoid untruths 
in scientific communication. He warns that desires to make communications more 
“glamorous” can lead scientific communicators to inflate their images and their content, 
which can lead to violations of truth—unethical behavior.  
With such different definitions of and approaches to truth, is honesty actually 
foundational? Scholars such as Porter, Michaelson, Buchholz, and Perica use truth as 
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foundational: a “universal basic [principle that should decide] concrete issues of 
practice” (Winkler qtd. in Markel, “A Case” 286). For them, truth is a universal ideal that 
all people in all situations can and should achieve. Truth informs the individual 
dilemmas; the dilemmas themselves should not change the universal basis of truth. In its 
applications, though, truth does not appear foundational or universal. In fact, truth is 
contextual, a phenomenon that these scholars do not adequately explain.  
For example, Michaelson claims that truthfulness is a primary ethical 
responsibility of the technical communicator. For instance, the communicator must 
always give full credit to others for their contributions and always crop photographs 
truthfully. These are standards of truth to which the communicator must always adhere. 
However, Michaelson later admits that “a distorted presentation is legitimate if it 
emphasizes and expands upon the significant aspects of your engineering work, while de-
emphasizing the routine and well-known portions” (59). In this statement, he denies the 
universality and foundational nature of truth. However, he does not expand on this 
contextual aspect of ethics. If truth is truly foundational and the communicator must 
always be honest in every situation, how can she make exceptions and distort her work? 
Michaelson offers no advice to the communicator for navigating this nonfoundational 
part of ethics. 
Porter, too, concedes that “certain forms of deception are not permissible…[but] 
certain deceptions are permissible and conventional” (183, emphasis added). He admits 
that truth depends upon the relationships among corporations, writers, and audiences; that 
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is, he concedes that even foundational ethics is somewhat nonfoundational because it is 
somewhat socially determined. Porter justifies his “permissible deceptions” by explaining 
that communication is rhetorical and persuasive, and persuasion is selective. Certain 
selective deceptions are legitimate if they enhance the rhetorical purposes and effects of 
the communication. However, if there are exceptions to a foundational ethic, that ethic is 
not entirely foundational and universally applicable. Ethics depends upon the contexts of 
each situation, but Porter offers only readability standards to help the communicator deal 
with the nonfoundational aspects of ethics. By not adequately explaining the 
nonfoundational features of foundational ethics, scholars such as these may inadvertently 
imply one of two things: that nonfoundational ethics is less important than foundational 
ethics and that foundational ethics alone can suffice in a dilemma, or that 
nonfoundational ethics is something that does not need to be addressed because it is 
common-sense, something that all communicators “just know.”  
Admitting the contextual nature of ethics gives rise to an important 
nonfoundational ethical question: “How and when should technical communicators 
warrant deceptions or selective truths?” Both Porter and Michaelson answer by 
permitting tricks that tell “the truth” but not necessarily “the whole truth.” In other words, 
a communication is honest if it gives an accurate account of the facts and withholds only 
unimportant or mundane information. However, assuming that technical communicators 
should include the important truths and leave out the unimportant ones presupposes that 
technical communicators intuitively know the truth. Granted, this matter of selection 
  
46
 
begins to admit the contextual nature of foundational ethics. However, neither Porter 
nor Michaelson clearly explains how such contextual selection functions; they do not 
give the communicator practical guidelines for knowing when and how to make 
exceptions to the universal rule of truth. Because they simply state that contextual 
exceptions are permissible but do not explain such exceptions, they seem to imply that 
the communicator will intuitively know when she can allow such anomalies. When 
scholars such as these assume that communicators simply perceive the truth, they 
reinforce the notion of a universal, unchanging truth that manifests itself to people in all 
situations. This quasi-admission of the contextual nature of foundational ethics does not 
admit the social contextual aspects of ethics or offer communicators guidelines for 
addressing those aspects. In short, it reinforces foundational ethics’ universal, 
foundational characteristics and slights its nonfoundational ones. 
Moreover, assuming that communicators will intuitively know truth and its 
legitimate exceptions is problematic, as William Buchholz illustrates:  
Underlying the…injunctions always to tell the truth, it would appear, are these 
assumptions: Truth…is objective…. I can strive for and capture Truth in the 
same way that I strive for and earn money or power. Second, such objective 
Truth is seen as essentially separable from the individual perspective or 
collective human experience. Truth transcends individuals and can exist 
independent of the human mind. Third, Truth is verifiable. Because it does 
exist outside the individual, others can know it as well I in essentially the 
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same way….[F]ourth, Truth is discrete. All I need is patience and time to 
acquaint you with the Truth. 66 
In fact, the idea of perceiving absolute truth reflects the windowpane theory of language, 
which holds that language is a conduit for transporting reality and truth. Commanding 
communicators to “be honest” without helping them understand what and how others 
perceive as “honesty” assumes the everyone intuits truth and does so in exactly the same 
way. It presumes that truth is objective. In short, under this foundational ethical view, 
communication could become a tool for transporting “the truth” from one person (who 
intuitively knows what truth to present and how) to another person (who intuitively 
knows what truth to extract and how).  
The contextualist theory of language shows that such an objective view of 
communication is unrealistic and irresponsible because language is socially contingent. 
Since language is contextual, it cannot objectively convey the truth; thus, communicators 
must fully understand and implement the contextual characteristics of their messages. 
The same principle holds true for ethics: communicators need to fully discern the 
contextual forces that help form “the truth.” As Buchholz resolves, “truth is evanescent—
subject to myriad viewpoints and perspectives. The professional, relying on personal 
judgment, therefore, cannot report the Truth, but can report his or her perspective on the 
truths, that is, on the truths as he sees them” (67). Truth appears to be a personal and 
contextual matter.  
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Utilitarianism 
Other approaches to ethics do not mandate values for all situations; instead, they 
prescribe methods of inquiry that should drive all ethical deliberations. One such process 
is utilitarianism. One of its founders, Jeremy Bentham, characterized utilitarianism this 
way: 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or 
oppose that happiness. Qtd. in Markel, “An Ethical” 82 
John Stuart Mill refined utilitarianism, arguing “for a qualitative [as opposed to 
Bentham’s quantitative] utilitarianism, one that distinguished between higher and lower 
pleasures” (Markel, “An Ethical” 82). Using either one or both of these definitions, 
modern technical communicators have appropriated versions of utilitarianism to strive for 
ethical communication.  
For example, after examining fraudulent communications from medical journals 
and mass media about breast cancer, Michael Zerbe, A.J. Young, and E.R. Nagelhout 
explain that the communicators involved should have “identified the most vital rhetorical 
exigency” (57) and fulfilled it. Their method of identifying such exigency is primarily 
utilitarian; it involves determining who should be given consideration and who should be 
given the most consideration. Based on this utilitarian reasoning, the communicator 
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should give preference to the “good” endorsed by the party who will be affected most 
by the information.  
Similarly, Christopher Schroll examines caller ID units from a utilitarian 
perspective. He resolves that communicators should provide the most honest, open 
information that is most necessary for the most people, whether that information deals 
with caller ID units or military weapons. He proposes an evaluative framework that asks 
certain questions, such as “What guidelines will allow us to utilize the technology such 
that everyone can reap its potential for better communication” and “To what extent 
should the United States share satellite-obtained information with allied countries who do 
not possess such technology?” (151, emphasis added). Answering these questions 
requires a utilitarian approach. For example, since it is highly unlikely that everyone can 
reap the benefits of any technology, Schroll’s first question becomes a matter of 
providing the best benefits to the greatest number of people. Likewise, his second 
question weighs the benefits of America’s keeping the information for itself against the 
benefits of sharing it. We answer the questions by distinguishing among the “goods” of 
those involved and engaging in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In 
each situation, ethics is a complicated issue.  
Cindy Williams likewise uses utilitarianism to explain Intel’s unethical response 
to its Pentium chip crisis: “Besides understanding its [Intel’s] customers in order to make 
ethical decisions, a company must also weigh the pros and cons of alternative decisions 
and choose the one that will create the greatest good” (16, emphasis added). However, 
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these theories basically propose viewing ethics as a foundational formula: in any 
situation, subtract one good from another and whichever is larger is more ethical.  
Moreover, utilitarianism is not a principle advocated by just a few 
communicators. Instead, some scholars have defended it as an important ingredient in the 
ethical education of students of technical communication (Golen et al). Proponents of this 
theory and those who employ it (even unwittingly) hold that communicators can apply 
the principle of utility to ethical questions and, based on its foundational tenets, find the 
most ethical end and then work toward that end. Granted, utilitarianism does not claim to 
be as unchanging and inflexible as do certain supposedly foundational values, and some 
scholars acknowledge the limitations of utilitarianism even while advancing it as a 
primary foundational ethic (Johannesen, Ethics; Markel, “An Ethical”; Sims; Cindy 
Williams). However, utilitarianism does claim to be a process of ethical deliberation—a 
foundation—that communicators can apply to any ethical situation. Regardless of the 
circumstances, utilitarianism is supposedly universally applicable. However, 
utilitarianism is not as foundational or universal as it may appear. 
First, foundational ethics must be applicable in any situation, but it may be 
difficult or even impossible to apply utilitarianism equitably in all situations. Schroll, for 
instance, assumes that his utilitarian questions can address any problem by determining 
the goods and rights that communicators must enforce and acknowledge. In any situation, 
this foundational process of utilitarianism should produce an ethical result. However, 
Richard Johannesen warns that “We should…be careful to consider the welfare of 
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minorities when judging the greatest good for the greatest number” (17). Even 
questions such as Schroll’s might not allow the communicator to acknowledge minorities 
fully, thus making utilitarianism ineffective in some situations. If foundational ethics is 
not universally applicable in real-life circumstances, then communicators need to 
supplement it with nonfoundational ethics.  
For example, if a communicator needs to document a given computer program, 
she may believe that most of her audience simply wants to know how to use the program. 
She may determine that the greatest good she can give the greatest number of people is a 
straightforward, step-by-step explanation of the program. However, the same program 
may contain several flaws. Under the principle of utilitarianism, the communicator might 
decide to ignore the flaws (which might affect only a minority of her audience) to make 
the documentation clearer and less cluttered for the majority of her readers. Under 
utilitarianism, hers is an entirely ethical decision. However, such an omission can be 
ethically dubious because it does not fully consider minorities who may be affected 
seriously by the program’s flaws. Instead, this utilitarian decision would privilege the 
majority or status quo at the expense of others. As TyAnna Herrington concludes, “Those 
who follow the utilitarian philosophy can justify almost any act through balancing in 
favor of a benefit against a cost” (152), even if that cost is sacrificing the needs of 
minority audience members. (See also Markel, “An Ethical” 82.) Thus, the 
nonfoundational factors playing in some situations make foundational ethics alone 
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inadequate for dealing with certain dilemmas. Communicators need to fully understand 
and be able to implement nonfoundational ethics. 
Therefore, utilitarianism demands a more complete examination of its 
nonfoundational aspects; however, scholars such as Johannesen and Herrington do not 
adequately address such aspects. Johannesen does not explain how communicators can 
equitably consider minorities in their ethical decision-making processes. Herrington 
advocates rhetorical processes for uncovering the contextual aspects of ethics, but she 
focuses primarily on the communication itself rather than on the social causes and effects 
of the communication. In both situations, the authors acknowledge ethics as somewhat 
nonfoundational, but they do not adequately explain when and how to employ 
nonfoundational ethics competently. In failing to do so, they unconsciously pronounce 
the nonfoundational characteristics as subordinate to (or even unimportant in light of) the 
foundational ethic of utilitarianism. 
Other forces act upon utilitarianism as well, making it contextual and demanding 
a thorough treatment of its nonfoundational traits. As Kenneth Burke explains, the 
principles of utility can be confused or coupled with other, conflicting principles, such as 
fiscal good:  
Despite Bentham’s distrust of idealizations, his principle of utility could serve 
as a rhetorical cloak for purely monetary utility. The close connection between 
them (in that the profits were earned by business men aiming eventually at 
mass markets) made it possible for the two orders of motives to become 
  
53
 
interwoven. Hence any proposals to neutralize nonutilitarian motives would 
be influenced by the extent to which the monetary motive had already 
transcended other motivational weightings. Rhetoric 96-97 
Burke’s objection to utilitarianism especially applies to technical communication. 
Technical communicators composing reports or making recommendations may consider 
the monetary profits and costs as essential “goods” in their communication, and they may 
make ethical decisions based upon those values. As Burke describes, though, if the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people is a monetary good, monetary utility 
colors all other principles of good.  
For example, if Intel had employed utilitarianism in its Pentium chip crisis, there 
is no guarantee that utility would not have been colored by fiscal values. Assuming that 
utilitarianism would have solved Intel’s problems supposes that Intel could objectively 
separate one good from another. In fact, though, because it is a for-profit organization, 
Intel’s ideas of good were likely colored by monetary motives, making their 
utilitarianism subjective and nonfoundational. Since this ethical approach involves social, 
nonfoundational forces, technical communicators need a complete treatment of the 
contextual nature of ethics. Again, though, they do not receive such a treatment, making a 
fair determination of “the greatest good for the greatest number of people” difficult if not 
impossible.  
Money is hardly the only factor that can influence the utilitarian idea of good, 
though. Richard Johannesen mentions others: “The definition of [utilitarian] ‘good’ is 
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often derived from religious, political, ontological, or other vantage points” (17). Amid 
all these conflicting influences, then, how does the communicator determine which good 
is the greatest? Most likely, she will use her personal religious or social convictions to 
answer that question. When she does so, she makes utilitarianism subjective. 
Utilitarianism is clearly subjective, then, relying on the individual communicator to 
determine both “good” and “greater good.” Moreover, there is no assurance that the 
communicator’s idea of good will coincide with the audience’s idea of good. Because it 
is affected by its context, it is not entirely foundational and requires nonfoundational 
understanding as well. 
This subjectivity necessitates including nonfoundational ethical approaches in the 
foundational ethic of utilitarianism. However, it is not helpful simply to mention the 
contextual nature of ethics without giving the communicator guidelines for determining 
and applying nonfoundational approaches. If communicators do not clearly explain the 
subjective, contextual aspects of utilitarianism, they can privilege it over nonfoundational 
ethics, creating the false belief that nonfoundational ethics is unimportant or even that 
utilitarianism is entirely foundational and does not need nonfoundational ethics. As 
Kenneth Burke illustrates, these assumptions can be dangerous. In “The Rhetoric of 
Hitler’s Battle,” Burke explains that Hitler felt that the holocaust was the greatest good 
(racial purity) for the greatest number of people (the Germans). Unfortunately, though, 
Nazi Germany failed to realize the subjectivity of their system of ethics (Philosophy 191-
220).  
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Kantian Ethics 
Another popular foundational ethical process is Kant’s categorical imperative 
(Markel, “An Ethical”; Sims; Williams). The categorical imperative has two primary 
commandments: at all times, act only in such a way that you should wish your actions to 
become universal laws, and always treat other humans as ends in themselves rather than 
as means to ends. Like truth, Kantian ethics has long-standing humanitarian and religious 
justifications, and it is widely accepted as one of the most important ethical foundations 
in communication. In fact, one of the most popular composition books, Joseph Williams’ 
Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace, mandates, “Write for others as you would have 
others write for you” (220). This axiom of universalized good has been appropriated 
generously in technical communication as well.  
Applying Kantian ethics to technical communication, Cindy Williams explains 
that in Kantian ethics, “[U]niversalizability is…expanded. An action is moral only if you 
and I and everyone could do it and still have a desirable society” (17). As Brenda Sims 
explains, actions that cannot be universalized according to the categorical imperative are 
simply wrong or unethical (285-87). Thus, according to this foundational standard, some 
actions are foundationally right or wrong. Mike Markel gives an example of Kantian 
ethics in technical communication: “The reason that we should not lie when we 
communicate is not that we can get in serious trouble…but that we would be treating our 
readers and listeners as means only: as customers or as subordinates or bosses, but not as 
people” (“An Ethical” 84). Although Markel admits that “Kant’s [categorical imperative] 
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is surely no ethical panacea” (85), he holds that if communicators can imagine 
themselves as their readers and then determine the universal ethicality of their actions, 
they are on relatively sure foundational ethical grounds (85).  
Likewise, Cindy Williams claims that Intel could have avoided some of its ethical 
quandaries (namely, unfair secrecy) if it had used Kantian ethics: “[Intel] could have 
thought about fairness, which would have required that the company treat its customers 
only as it would want or expect to be treated by others” (17). The supporters of Kantian 
ethics generally hold that this foundational approach objectively applies to all situations. 
For example, although Williams applies it to Intel’s ethical emergency, she concludes 
that it is equally fitting for other technical businesses in other communication dilemmas. 
Ideally, in any situation, a communicator can use Kantian ethics because the categorical 
imperative informs every ethical dilemma and prescribes an ethical course of action.  
Upon closer examination, though, Kantian ethics is somewhat subjective and 
nonfoundational. Kenneth Burke specifically examines Kantian ethics and its focus on 
individual (in our case, the communicator), what Burke calls “the agent.” Burke explains 
that even though Kantian ethics stresses the role of the co-agent (the other members of 
society upon whom the universalized law would be imposed), it nonetheless relies 
primarily on the agent or communicator. Burke demonstrates, 
In deriving causality from the realm covered by our term agent…, we need 
not mean individual agents. For if we did, the causal principle would still lack 
universality. That it, it would lack objective reality…. The causal principle 
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need not be assigned to the agent in this sense. Instead, we can universalize 
our concept of agent. We can say that such a way of seeing is not the property 
of just your understanding or my understanding but of “the understanding” in 
general. Grammar 187, emphasis in original 
Kantian ethics can make an ethical standard appear universal, the product of a 
generalized, ultimate, and ethical agent. Still, in an actual, individual ethical dilemma, it 
is the actual, individual agent who must decide which standards apply to the dilemma and 
must wish an action universalized.  
Many scholars have noted how the categorical imperative appears to privilege the 
agent and reflect her ethics: [You] act only on that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law. As Jeffrey Murray shows in 
examining Burke, in Kantian ethics, “the focus of the attention….is on the moral agent or 
self from whom adjudication criteria arise” (36). The same problem thus applies to 
Kantian ethics as to utilitarianism: how does the communicator not privilege her own 
ideas of rightness and wrongness at the expense of others? Moreover, in discussing the 
problems of Kantian ethics, Linda Bensel-Meyers notes that the precept to universalize 
laws could actually allow for sadistic or masochistic decisions by those who might 
actually want to universalize such behaviors (Lecture). Kantian ethics is very subjective, 
then. Ethical situations are not simply informed by the categorical imperative; instead, 
they are influenced largely by the individual deciding the situation, who is in turn 
influenced by myriad social factors.  
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Since Kantian ethics is contextual, it has certain nonfoundational 
characteristics. However, technical communicators often overlook its contextual nature. 
Although they admit that Kantian ethics relies on the individual (making it somewhat 
subjective) they still hold that the ethical principle itself is unchanging and foundational. 
Williams, for example, determines that Intel’s Pentium chip dilemma has made other 
businesses more ethically alert and more needful of Kantian ethics. She resolves, “The 
most basic information can be obtained…by asking questions based on Kantian 
principles,” the answers to which will determine ethical public policy (19). She does not 
explain how communicators might deal with the social factors that inform Kantian ethics, 
though. For example, as other scholars have noted, the categorical imperative privileges 
the individual, making it somewhat nonfoundational. Williams does not address this 
nonfoundational aspect of foundational Kantian ethics. She does not explain how 
contextual factors such as selfishness among decision makers will affect this foundational 
ethic. By failing to do so, she intimates that the foundational features of Kantian ethics 
are more important than the nonfoundational ones. Slighting nonfoundational ethics in 
this way could lead communicators to focus too exclusively on a foundational ethical 
approach that neither describes nor addresses adequately the nonfoundational problems in 
their own ethical predicaments. 
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Problems with Foundational Ethical Theories 
Foundational ethical theories get their power from their status as unchanging, 
universal precepts. They are popular because they mandate principles that any person in 
any situation can apply, regardless of special circumstances. None of these ethical 
theories, though, is truly foundational and universal. Since foundational ethics falls short 
of universality and constancy, technical communicators also need nonfoundational ethical 
considerations in the decision-making process. However, when scholars admit that 
foundational ethics is somewhat contextual, they simply mention its nonfoundational 
aspects without clearly explicating them and showing communicators how to employ 
them. By not treating nonfoundational ethics as equally creditable as foundational ethics, 
some research in technical communication could imply that nonfoundational ethics is less 
important.  
Granted, none of the scholarship that I have found on ethics in technical 
communication states that one foundational approach is exclusively sufficient for every 
ethical problem. However, much of it largely does disregard nonfoundational ethics, 
implying that foundational ethics is more suitable for technical communication than 
nonfoundational ethics. It is possible that technical communicators could read these 
inferences as permission to ignore nonfoundational ethics and to use foundational ethics 
solely. There are two very nagging problems with relying too heavily on foundational 
ethics, though: not acknowledging the people and factors outside the communicator that 
contribute to ethical decisions, and focusing too narrowly on the consequences of ethical 
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decisions. As I explain, these shortcomings illustrate how no one foundational ethic 
can serve as a solitary ethical theory without reference to other theories and factors. 
Therefore, technical communicators need to address more completely the 
nonfoundational aspects of ethics in technical communication.  
Featuring the Individual Communicator at the Expense of Other Parties and 
Factors. The foundational theories of ethics that I have cited tend to leave ethical 
determinations up to the individual. Many of the supporters of these theories admit that 
ethics is subjective, but they do not fully explore all of the various subjective forces at 
work in ethical dilemmas. Instead, they mention the contextual features of ethics and then 
return to its foundational aspects, implying that the communicator will somehow know 
how to navigate these subjectivities. By assuming that the communicator “just knows” 
how to interpret foundational ethics and how and when to judge among subjectivities, 
these ethical theories can place too much emphasis on the individual who is making the 
ethical decision. They do not fully allow the communicator to acknowledge different 
contextual aspects of foundational ethics. As a result, they can actually lead the 
individual communicator to believe that ethics is the same for everyone, and that her 
individual ethical values are the same as everyone else’s. These theories can deny the rich 
contextual nature of foundational ethics, substituting for it an individual’s personal ethic. 
In an extreme situation, they could even allow the communicator to believe that, since her 
own value system is in place and reflects (as she sees fit) foundational ethics, she need 
not fully consider other voices when making decisions of ethics.  
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Indeed, individual interpretation of foundational ethics is inevitable. Sam 
Dragga, a renowned scholar in ethics in technical communication, admits that technical 
communicators rely heavily upon “hunches” or “gut feelings” to make decisions of ethics 
(“Is this”). (See also Faber 190.) He later advocates nurturing these instincts by modeling 
one’s life and personal beliefs after heroic (upstanding, ethical) individuals (“Question”; 
see also David and Graham). John Bryan, too, advises technical communicators to 
internalize theories of truth and ethics and then to apply them to their professional 
careers. Similarly, Harley Sachs states that “moral ethics is at the core of [all ethics] and 
may be inseparable” (7), objecting to other scholars’ attempts to separate “professional” 
[or corporate] ethics from “moral” [or personal] ethics (i.e., Wicclair and Farkas; 
Shimberg). As these scholars illustrate, foundational ethics relies heavily on personal 
ethics. Whether based on honesty, utilitarianism, or Kantian ethics, foundational ethical 
theories hold that for the communication to be ethical, the communicator must be “good” 
or at least a good applicator of the universal precept. (See Sanders, “Technical” and 
Porter, “The Role” 128-33.) From such a standpoint, foundational ethics can feature the 
communicator almost exclusively.  
Placing ethical responsibility on the communicator is hardly problematic; 
undoubtedly, the communicator has a great degree of ethical obligation. However, if 
ethics focuses too heavily on the communicator, ethics becomes a matter of perfecting the 
communicator. When this happens, technical communication (as a field) runs the risk of 
mandating morality to its communicators. As Frank Radez warns, “The [scholarship in 
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technical communication] should not care about our moral code…. It has no business 
evaluating our religious views” (5). John Bryan agrees, stating that “We [instructors of 
technical communication] cannot teach integrity” (87). Moreover, when professionals 
and corporations do attempt to shape individual morality, there is no assurance that they 
are not doing so simply “to keep [others] in line” (Moore, “When Politeness” 274), 
potentially a morally suffocating practice. If foundational ethics relies too much on the 
individual’s ethics and attempts to perfect the individual’s morality, it could actually 
restrict the individual’s values and beliefs. 
Even when communicators do apply a well-developed personal ethical code to 
their professional ethical decisions, they may be unconsciously reacting to other, less-
ethical pressures. Giacalone and Rosenfeld state, “Research is supportive of the notion 
that a decision-maker need not be asocial or sociopathic in order to create an unethical 
situation; but often, due to the very nature of his/her high ego-involvement in the project, 
(the decision-maker) may be subject to perceptual biases of which he/she has little 
awareness” (qtd. in Johnson et al 4). Even ethical communicators can make unethical 
decisions, so allowing the communicator to call the ethical shots can be problematic. In 
fact, the desire to do “good business” can affect a communicator’s ability to make ethical 
decisions. For example, Herbert Michaelson urges communicators to be honest so that 
their credibility and “standing among peers” are not diminished (61). Lori Allen and Dan 
Voss admonish that “honesty and good ethics are good business” (“Ethics for Editors” 
63). (See also Cindy Williams 15.) As Steven Katz explains, these other factors can 
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actually act upon ethics and become means to other ends, “like appeals to give to 
charity based on the advantage of a tax break” (261). Pleas to the communicator’s desire 
for reputation and success are motives that may influence her ethical reasoning in less 
ethical ways. Since a communicator with an excellent personal ethic can be swayed 
unwittingly by other personal motivations, it is irresponsible to assume that the 
communicator will “just know” how to “correctly” apply foundational ethics.  
However, this feeling of intuitive personal ethics is frighteningly real in technical 
communication. In his technical communication class, Cezar Ornatowski explains that 
there is a pervasive feeling that communicators complacently “just know” ethical rights 
and wrongs: “My students, the ones who do not work, feel very smug about being honest 
and get impatient when I talk about ethics” (99). A self-assurance in personal ethics could 
actually lead communicators (at least novice ones) to believe that ethics is not a matter of 
careful deliberation; it is always something they “just know” without further exploration. 
Some foundational theories reinforce this idea when they do not thoroughly address all of 
the contextual properties of ethics. Communicators who use such theories could come to 
believe that nonfoundational issues simply fall into place because they intuitively know 
the foundational issues. As a result, though, those communicators can fall prey to an 
individualized, prescriptive, intuitive ethics, which assumes that any communicator can 
make the “right” choice by applying the “right” value or method of ethical inquiry.  
As Carolyn Miller illustrates, ethics—and the decision-making process in 
general—is not that simplistic (“Technology). James Porter concurs; in fact, he explains 
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that prescriptive principles (i.e., foundational ethics) can actually alienate practitioners 
because those principles are enmeshed in theories that do not adequately apply to the 
pragmatic applications that communicators face (“The Role”). The result is an ineffective 
ethic that mandates a personal, theoretical morality that is difficult to employ practically. 
In light of these issues, two important questions emerge: “Does the field of technical 
communication have the right to mandate personal ethics to its practitioners? Even if it 
could, would communicators always act purely and conscientiously according to those 
ethics on the job?” If the answer to either of these questions is anything but an 
unqualified yes, then it is problematic for foundational theories to focus on the ethics of 
the communicator and to not fully develop the other social factors that inform decisions 
of ethics. 
Privileging the End Over the Means. Many ethical theories tend to be goal-
based rather than process-based: “the rightness or wrongness of an action is a function of 
the goodness or badness of its consequences” (Wicclair and Farkas 15, emphasis added). 
Foundational ethics is especially susceptible to this practice because it tends to focus on 
the end result rather than on the means. Honesty as a foundational ethic, for example, 
mandates truthfulness as the result of the communicator’s message. Granted, it would be 
difficult for the communicator’s message to be honest if her means of creating the 
message were not honest. However, this ethic still emphasizes the ends over the means 
because a communicator may produce a truthful statement that she purposely crafted to 
not reveal the whole truth. From a foundational viewpoint, the end product is not false, so 
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the communicator might rest assured that she had fulfilled her ethical obligations. 
However, if her purpose—or process of creating that statement—were deceptive, then 
she privileged the end product over the means. Similarly, utilitarianism requires an action 
that produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. It does not demand that 
the method of achieving the goal be beneficial to the greatest number of people, only the 
end product. In other words, these foundational ethics are generally teleological 
approaches.  
Kantian ethics is the exception here. As David Sturges explains, it is a 
deontological approach to ethics (duty- or process-based rather than consequence-based) 
(44). Of course, technical communicators could still use the categorical imperative to 
elevate products over processes. The precept could spotlight the end result, the 
universalized regulation: act only in such a way that you would wish your actions to 
become universal laws, with the focus on the laws themselves. However, Kantian ethics 
also demands attention to the processes of the individual’s acting and the law’s 
becoming. Therefore, Kantian ethics is a deontological approach that considers the 
processes of ethical decision making more completely than other foundational ethics.  
Of course, the teleological aspect of ethics can be desirable. As Paul Dombrowski 
explains, the communicator must consider the consequences of her actions; she cannot 
rely simply on a given “system of procedures” for making ethical decisions (“Can Ethics” 
146). However, he also warns that ethics must be a process, not just a product (149). 
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Unfortunately, though, foundational ethical theories can neglect the processes of 
making ethical decisions.  
Of these teleological approaches, David Sturges cites utilitarianism as one of the 
most dominant in technical communication (44). Clearly, utilitarianism promotes 
products over processes. If a communicator must decide which information to include in 
a user manual based on providing the greatest good to the greatest number of people, she 
first chooses a desirable “good”—an end result—and then works toward achieving it. 
Whatever routes she takes to achieve that good are secondary; they are sanctioned 
because the end is ethical. The end justifies the means, even if those means involve 
dismissing important social factors. Utilitarianism generally disregards the possibility that 
the process of achieving its end might not be moral. Some scholars show that we must 
have ethical reservations about a system of morality that can privilege the ends at the 
expense of the means, ignoring the social factors that are involved in the decision-making 
process (Dragga, “Is This”). 
Similarly, using humanitarian values such as honesty favors products over 
processes. For example, in creating a graph for a technical report, a communicator may 
decide that “truth” demands her to label both axes, providing as complete information as 
she has available. Indeed, her end product may be truthful. However, if she has given 
more information than necessary and the graph is no longer readable, her communication 
is truthful at the expense of being useful, a sacrifice that can actually make the 
communication less good and less ethical. If a user cannot interpret and employ the graph 
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and its contents, then the user is ill-informed and could make unnecessary—even 
dangerous—misjudgments. The communicator must fully appreciate the contextual 
nature of truth. She must understand that her ideas of truth do not automatically 
correspond with her audience’s. As a result, she cannot strive only for an ethical product, 
a document that is truthful by her own standards. She must also seek an ethical process, a 
means of understanding, working with, and perhaps accommodating her audience’s 
standards of truth.  
Many scholars have noted the dangers inherent in privileging ends over means. In 
a powerful statement on the pitfalls of such consequentialism, Sam Dragga asks, “If I 
decide the ethics of a situation according to its consequences, am I ethically obliged to 
weigh all of the consequences?” (“Is This” 263). He gives the following example: most 
communicators agree that it is ethical to increase font size and margins in a proposal to 
make it longer and hence more impressive-looking. They justify this action because they 
deem the consequence—a longer proposal—as ethical according to their personal 
foundational ethics. However, Dragga questions if these communicator are being ethical 
by using more paper than necessary, especially given our limited natural resources, 
including trees. The communicators may not feel the need to consider this consequence 
because they may have already deemed their chosen consequence as ethical. When 
communicators focus on products rather than processes, they do not fully appreciate all of 
the options available to them. If they do not appreciate different options, they cannot 
appreciate the different social forces that influence and are influenced by those other 
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viewpoints. Therefore, privileging the ends over the means can actually allow the 
communicator to minimize the importance of the nonfoundational aspects of foundational 
ethics. 
In response to such problems, many technical communicators are calling for an 
increased understanding of the processes of ethical deliberation (Nilsen 45; Sanders and 
Killingsworth 129; Dragga, “A Question”). Carolyn Miller demands that we understand 
our tasks “as a matter of conduct rather than of production, as a way toward the good of 
the community rather than of constructing texts” (“What’s Practical” 23). Marshall 
Kremers calls this process “ethical thinking or reasoning” (58). Perhaps arguing most 
persuasively for a closer examination of ethical processes is Steven Katz in “The Ethic of 
Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust.” Katz examines a memo 
written by a technical communicator in Nazi Germany and notes the memo’s technical 
expertise. As a product, it is technically perfect, illustrating outstanding communication 
principles as it recommends changes to Nazi gassing buses (256-59). (These buses were 
deemed “more efficient” and “humane” for exterminating women and children in Nazi 
Germany in the early 1940s, before the gas chambers and death camps were fully 
operational (256).) However, Katz explains that in this memo, “the focus is on 
expediency, on technical criteria as a means to an end” (257), and eventually that 
expediency becomes “the necessary good that subsumes all other goods, and becomes the 
basis of virtue itself” (263). The end actually becomes the means, justifying or 
obliterating any objections—ethical or otherwise—that might stand in its path. Obviously 
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in this case, the ethical repercussions of subsuming or ignoring processes in favor of 
products were disastrous.  
 
The Need for Nonfoundational Considerations in Foundational 
Ethics 
 
Modern technical communicators owe themselves, their profession, and their 
audiences a fuller examination of the mitigating social factors and the ethical processes 
inherent in making ethical decisions, considerations not always made fully possible by 
foundational ethics. Some scholarship on foundational ethics implies that 
nonfoundational ethics is not important or is “automatic” for technical communicators 
because it gives less attention to nonfoundational ethics. Instead, scholarship in ethics in 
technical communication needs to address nonfoundational ethics just as completely as 
foundational ethics. Communicators cannot competently address their variegated ethical 
dilemmas if their ethical theory does not fully admit and explain the contextual forces 
that affect decisions of ethics. In short, communicators need nonfoundational ethics as 
well.  
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Chapter Four: Nonfoundational Ethics 
Nonfoundational ethics has been called situational or relative ethics. In it, there 
are no universal, unchanging values or bases. Instead, ethics changes to accommodate 
each individual situation. It changes because, in each set of circumstances, members of a 
community mediate with one another to determine their needs and values. Those values 
determine ethics. In this nonfoundational ethics, Mike Markel explains that “the words 
reason, knowledge, and ethics do not have fixed meanings; rather, they are culturally and 
historically determined…. [N]onfoundational approach[es do] not offer principles or 
guidelines about what is appropriate ethical behavior, although [they] might offer 
principles or guidelines for analyzing an ethical problem” (284). Thus, ethics is 
contextual, not universal. 
One of the first and most frequently cited proponents of nonfoundational ethics in 
communication is Thomas Nilsen. Nilsen does not deny that individuals have their own 
values and belief systems, or that these values may be foundational, based in religious or 
humanitarian convictions. Nor does he deny that individuals may make personal ethical 
decisions outside of a nonfoundational framework. However, he does state that the most 
ethical communication is that which is open, inclusive, and situation specific. Both this 
process of negotiation and the resulting action are nonfoundational because there are not 
set outcomes; the values and subsequent actions change according to the values of the 
individuals involved in each separate ethical dilemma. Thus, contrary to the precepts of 
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foundational ethics, Nilsen and nonfoundational ethicists advocate “ethical guidelines, 
not fixed criteria” (Johannesen, Ethics 25) 
Nonfoundational ethics strives to be a more democratic approach to ethics, 
especially when compared to foundational ethics, which prescribes values for all people 
in all situations. Richard Johannesen explains that nonfoundational ethics is democratic 
because it is a system of inquiry that  
values…the intrinsic worth of the human personality, reason as an instrument 
of individual and societal development, self-determination as the means to 
individual fulfillment, and human realization of individual potentialities. 
Necessary democratic procedures include unrestricted debate and discussion; 
varied forms of public address, parliamentary procedure, and legal procedure; 
freedom of inquiry, criticism, and choice; and publicly defined rules of 
evidence and tests of reasoning. Ethics 24-25 
Dennis Day elaborates on the democratic ideal in nonfoundational ethics. For 
him, ethics is not any “particular set of substantive values” (such as honesty or 
utilitarianism) (qtd. in Johannesen, “Ethics” 28). It “is a commitment to means, not ends” 
(28). Day explains that such ethics does not value the end result—the reasoned solution—
over the means of achieving that result—an open discourse. In fact, he states that ethics 
requires a “commitment to debate, not a commitment to reason” because “the essential 
feature of debate is the confrontation of ideas” (28). The open discussion of ideas and 
values is the primary goal of nonfoundational ethics. The end result is not a manifestation 
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of some eternal verity; rather, it is the result of negotiation among positions. This ethic 
“accepts certain ends, i.e., decisions, because they have been arrived at by democratic 
means” (28). In other words, although individuals may hold their own commitment to 
ends, the collective society must constantly commit to the means: determining its wants 
and needs, and renegotiating its own values. In nonfoundational ethics, because society 
generally decides on its needs and thus its values, meeting those values is good; it is 
ethical.  
Many scholars advocate this nonfoundational approach to ethics. They agree that 
society—not some universalized and perhaps obsolete rule or system of morality—should 
determine values and thus ethics. Scott Sanders, for example, recommends “persuasion 
through mediation” (“How Can” 64), an ethic that is negotiated among writer and 
audience. The writer then adopts that ethic and tries to persuade her audience to 
cooperate with it. H. Lee Shimberg also promotes a socially constructed ethics, but he 
urges communicators themselves to come together as a profession to determine their 
values and hence an ethical code. Whether nonfoundational ethics is ordained by the 
profession, a particular audience, or society at large, it is nonfoundational: the group sets 
its values and its ethics according to its needs at a particular time under particular 
circumstances.  
Nonfoundational ethics has its limitations, though. Admittedly, most researchers 
of nonfoundational ethics grant that this approach cannot by itself solve every ethical 
dilemma. They concede that socially determined, changing ethics has its drawbacks and 
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that, in fact, it may be impossible to have a system of ethics that is not influenced by 
universal, foundational values. For instance, Richard Johannesen confesses that “the 
increasing difficulty of achieving genuine dialogue between men of divergent natures and 
beliefs represents the central problem for the fate of mankind” (“The Emerging” 375). It 
is difficult to believe that truly democratic, consensus-driven ethics is possible in an age 
of diversity and plurality. Often, individual and foundational values make 
nonfoundational ethics impossible. 
However, Johannesen does not explain how nonfoundational ethics can overcome 
this problem, how it is a useful system of ethics in spite of this difficulty. Instead, he 
reinforces nonfoundational guidelines by imploring communicators to avoid superiority 
and to encourage other parties to participate in the communication process (376). How, 
exactly, the communicator should achieve these goals Johannesen does not state, though. 
Rather than elaborating specifically on how communicators can overcome the difficulties 
inherent in nonfoundational ethics, Johannesen returns to the principles of 
nonfoundational ethics. In doing so, he reinforces the guidelines of nonfoundational 
ethics but does not fully consider some of its most basic problems. Excluding such 
questions could lead the reader to believe that the restraints upon nonfoundational ethics 
are insignificant and that this system of ethics is more solid and certain than it is.  
Granted, Johannesen does admit that there are problems with dialogic ethics: “A 
critical issue is, in fact, whether dialogue can be subjected to empirical research” and “If 
empirical research on dialogue is undertaken, what methods might be employed?” (378). 
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Each of Johannesen’s reservations about dialogic ethics (as well as his ultimate 
recommendation for future research) deals with empirical research. He does not address 
whether such a dialogic approach is even possible in mass communication. By simply 
bypassing this question, he leaves the reader assuming that dialogic ethics must be 
feasible since the primary question is one of how to conduct research. And such 
assumptions assert the power of nonfoundational ethics without truly addressing some of 
its most fundamental dilemmas.  
In the same article, Johanessen recognizes the foundational ethics that influences 
dialogic ethics: “One…does not forego his own convictions or views, but he strives to 
understand those of the other and avoids imposing his own on the other” (375). Thus, an 
individual may have ideas of value and ethics that have been determined by universal 
precepts such as honesty or by Kantian ethics. Still, according to Johannesen, in dialogic 
ethics the individual should attempt to acknowledge and respect others’ values as 
completely as her own. How, then, does the individual deal with the foundational ethics 
that affect her own participation in dialogic ethics? Johannesen offers no solution to this 
question. He advises a “willingness to become fully involved with each other by taking 
time, avoiding distraction, being communicatively accessible, and risking attachment” 
(376). However, these guidelines do not help the communicator practically mediate 
between the inevitable influence of foundational ethics and her need to create social 
values within a system of nonfoundational ethics.  
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Again, then, this research on nonfoundational ethics slights the foundational 
aspects of morality that necessarily affect ethical dilemmas. By not completely discussing 
these foundational characteristics, such research sends the message that foundational 
influences are insignificant, an assumption that can be dangerous if it leads the 
communicator to believe that society always and unquestionably has the right to 
determine and impose values on others.  
In this chapter, I look at two primary divisions of nonfoundational ethics: dialogic 
ethics and ethics of professionalism (which leads to ethics of expediency and professional 
codes of conduct), explaining how each has been appropriated in technical 
communication. However, I also show how no ethical system can be completely 
nonfoundational because a true consensus of values is almost impossible and because 
foundational values constantly infect systems of nonfoundational ethics. Therefore, 
nonfoundational ethical research needs to fully address both its own limitations and the 
role of foundational ethics. However, I find that much research in nonfoundational ethics 
does not adequately address either of these issues, and I illustrate how nonfoundational 
approaches can be problematic if they do not fully explore these problems.  
I do not undertake to prove that every nonfoundational ethical approach is gravely 
deficient, entirely disregarding its own limitations and foundational traits. Instead, I show 
that there are problems when scholars represent nonfoundational ethics as too complete in 
itself or overlook foundational ethics. I conclude by exploring some serious problems 
with nonfoundational ethics that could occur if technical communicators continue to 
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slight foundational ethics. Although the drawbacks I cite may be extreme, they 
nonetheless warn of the dangerous possibilities of depending too greatly on 
nonfoundational ethics.  
 
Dialogic Ethics 
 In one of the most important statements on dialogic ethics, Thomas Nilsen 
explains that in this nonfoundational ethic, “What we seek is the maximum freedom of 
choice possible in any given case” (46) because “morally right speech, like any morally 
right behavior, is that which contributes to the well-being of others, to their fulfillment as 
human beings” (18). Dialogic ethics is that which allows for the fullest expression of 
each individual. Nilsen continues, 
[T]he good is served by communications that preserve and strengthen the 
processes of democracy, that provide adequate information, diversity of 
views, and knowledge of alternative choices and their consequences. It is 
served by communications that provide significant debate, applying rational 
thought to controversial issues, recognizing at the same time the importance 
and relevance of feeling and personal commitment. Further, the good is served 
by communications that foster freedom of expression and constructive 
criticism, that set an example of quality in speech content, in language use, 
and in fair play and civility. 18  
  
77
 
The basis for dialogic ethics, then, is respect for human viewpoints and for the 
subjectivities of human experience. However, there are no rules for achieving this 
respect; the only mandate is to strengthen a democratic, consensual approach to ethics 
however possible in each individual situation. More importantly, there is no standard that 
this ethic must meet, no universal value that it should ultimately achieve. Instead, the 
discourse community itself determines what its values are and acts according to those 
values, which will change from group to group and situation to situation.  
In technical communication, there are many appropriations of dialogic ethics. As 
James Porter explains, dialogic ethics does not seek a universal good but a local 
consensus (“Developing” 215-16). J. Blake Scott calls this system sophistic ethics, which 
is based on “nomos, a word that can refer to…anything determined by 
people….[S]ophistic ethics,” he concludes, is “relative and determined by people in 
specific situations” (188, 192). (See also Berlin, “Poststructuralism.”) Dale Sullivan also 
advocates a culturally determined approach to rhetoric and ethics, which he calls 
epideictic (“The Epideictic”). Whatever its title and description, though, each of these 
theories has in common the belief that a community determines values; if the 
community—rather than a preordained set of beliefs or system of inquiry—ordains 
values (which are the heart of ethics (see Chapter 1)), then ethics is nonfoundational. (See 
also Chesebro; Johannesen “Emerging”; Johannesen Ethics; Keller and Brown.) 
Other technical communicators have applied dialogic ethics to practical ethical 
dilemmas, showing how nonfoundational ethics could be helpful in the workplace. 
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Herndl, Fennell, and Miller implicitly utilize it to investigate several communication 
disasters, including the Three Mile Island accident. (The Three Mile Island incident was 
the worst nuclear power disaster in American history. On March 28, 1979, a nuclear 
reactor at a nuclear plant in Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania overheated and the 
uranium core partially melted . As a result, the plant and surrounding areas were exposed 
radioactive water and gases (“Meltdown”; “Three Mile Island”).) Herndl, Fennell, and 
Miller conclude that some of the nonfoundational social characteristics of the 
communication leading up to the accident made understanding and negotiation difficult. 
Instead of recognizing and mediating these individual differences, some communicators 
took a self-concerned approach to the dilemma. One engineer, for example, failed to state 
his purpose clearly and was indirect; his supervisor responded with sarcasm (285-90). 
These communicators were concerned with their own agendas and did not recognize the 
values and needs of one another—their audience. The communicators did not fully and 
equally consider their audiences and did not allow the audiences to express themselves. 
Hence, from a nonfoundational viewpoint, they were not ethical.  
Similarly, Craig Waddell uses dialogic ethics to investigate the responsibilities of 
communicators who document environmental policies. He proposes that when disputes 
arise concerning environmental matters, the communicator should mediate between the 
values and needs of the environmental experts and those of the lay public. Together, the 
two parties should determine their needs and negotiate values that correspond to those 
needs. Since needs shape values, and values shape ethics, if the two parties act according 
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to their negotiated values, they are acting ethically. In short, dialogic ethics is ethical 
because it does not force people with different values to adhere to a universal set of 
beliefs. Rather, it concedes a variety of needs and the necessity of human beings to 
determine their own values, which are specific to the needs of individual people and 
situations.  
If dialogic ethics is truly nonfoundational—if members of a discourse community 
equitably determine its needs, values, and ethics for each individual situation—it might 
be ideal for modern pluralistic society. However, dialogic ethics is not truly 
nonfoundational. It depends largely upon the values of each individual in the discourse 
community, and those values may be foundational. Dialogic ethics has other flaws, too, 
such as being too difficult too implement. To be helpful to technical communicators, 
research in dialogic ethics must fully address these issues. Often, though, it does not. 
When dialogic ethics does not elaborate on these problems, it sends the message that 
individual (often foundational) values are less important than nonfoundational ones and 
that the flaws in nonfoundational ethics are insignificant.  
For example, when proponents of dialogic ethics admonish communicators to 
pursue ethics as mediation among voices, are they requesting something beyond the 
communicator’s scope? Practical examples suggest they are. Craig Waddell, for example, 
urges the communicator to negotiate the values of the lay public and environmental 
experts when documenting public policy. Indeed, there are several rhetorical steps that 
the communicator could take to pursue such a moderation. She could avoid jargon so that 
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the non-expert public can understand the experts’ processes and policies; she could 
facilitate discussions with the experts so that they can become familiar with the needs and 
desires of the public. However, these actions are secondary to the environmental policies 
themselves. The communicator can try to make the policies more accurately reflect the 
general needs of the general public, but she will probably be unable to change them. This 
ethic appears to be outside of the communicator’s scope here, a problem that Waddell 
(and much research on nonfoundational ethics) does not address. If this issue is not 
considered, communicators could come to believe that it is not an issue, that they should 
be able to employ dialogic ethics in every communication situation. However, the 
communicator may find that, in actuality, truly dialogic ethics is impossible for her in 
certain situations. If a communicator cannot pragmatically implement an ethical theory, 
the theory is not helpful. Thus, researchers in dialogic ethics must fully admit the 
limitations of nonfoundational ethics and help communicators find alternative ethical 
frameworks that are available to them, even if they are foundational ones. 
Moreover, even if communicators could completely employ dialogic ethics, 
giving full consideration to every voice that deserves it, how would communicators know 
which voices deserve consideration and which do not? In writing a manual explaining 
technical machinery, it is unrealistic to assume that a communicator can fully consider 
every voice that will encounter her manual. Her only recourse is to engage in the best 
audience analysis techniques available to her. By doing so, though, she stereotypes her 
readers, a process that does not allow full consideration and expression of each individual 
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voice. Giving expression to each opinion is increasingly difficult in the 21st century, 
when communicators often write online help documents and create web sites for mass 
audiences. It is impossible to allow every individual a voice, but research in 
nonfoundational ethics tends to overlook this quandary. Scholarship in nonfoundational 
ethics falls short again when it does not help the communicator determine what to do 
when dialogic ethics becomes impossible. In fact, such a failure implies that the 
communicator either will intuitively know what to do in such situations or that such 
problems are not important. Either way, the ethic is incomplete.  
If the communicator assumes that she will intuit which voices to heed (and 
negotiate with) and which to ignore, she is not truly employing dialogic ethics. In these 
situations, the communicator relies on her own personal values to judge the worth of 
others’ arguments, and she does not truly consider the values of others. Furthermore, the 
communicator may not know that she is using dialogic ethics incompletely because she 
may not realize which values she unconsciously privileges and, therefore, what counter-
values she should regard. Craig Waddell states, “it is said that a fish in the ocean would 
be the last to discover water; likewise, when we are immersed in the prevailing values 
and assumptions of our culture, their status as values and assumptions is all but invisible 
to us” (211). In fact, if the communicator does recognize her own implicit values and 
assumptions, she might actually find values similar to her own to “negotiate” with, 
unconsciously privileging one voice—her own—above all others’.  
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Perhaps because this ideal is so problematic, some technical communicators 
have refined dialogic ethics, equating it with the rhetorical concept of ethos. This dialogic 
ethical guide requires that the communicator create an ethos that is consistent with or at 
least includes the audience’s ethos. In short, because ethos reflects society’s values, a 
social ethos becomes a measure of dialogic ethics. James Porter simply and succinctly 
defines social ethos:  
Collaboration occurs between writer and audience, the audience becomes the 
writer, the writer becomes one with the audience. The ethical implication here 
then is not just that it is to the advantage of the writer to “analyze” audience, 
but to “identify” with audience, negotiate meaning with the audience, and 
work to blur those roles. “The Role” 134 
Ben Barton and Marthalee Barton agree; they outline ethos as a socially 
determined role that the communicator must fill. She should negotiate her ethos from 
among the various forces and people involved in a situation. When the communicator 
adopts that ethos, she is successful. Her ethos is dialogically ethical. Charles Campbell 
refines the concept of ethos: “[Ethos involves] the individual in a deliberative community 
and thus [has]…an ethical dimension as well as a transactional one” (133). Although 
Campbell admits that ethos is not synonymous with ethics (135), he cites ethos as the 
mediation and resulting relationship between writer and audience. Moreover, he 
encourages communicators to meet the demands of different situations and different 
audiences by constructing different ethoi. From a nonfoundational ethical view, this 
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concept of ethos is a reinterpretation of dialogic ethics because it allows the individuals 
in each situation to ascertain their needs, privilege the corresponding values, and create 
an ethical ethos that conforms to those values.  
A strong ethos can be desirable in technical communication. Dorothy Guinn 
explains that a positive ethos is highly persuasive, convincing the audience that the 
communicator is an expert on her topic and has their best interests in mind. Scott 
Sanders, too, examines rhetorical ethos as a method of audience and self-analysis that 
contributes to the most persuasive persona and, hence, the most effective communication. 
This ethos can make the audience more willing to cooperate with the communicator, 
creating beneficial social collaboration.  
However, even if it is socially constructed, ethos can be used to manipulate and 
privilege one particular party. Carolyn Miller explains, “Ethos is a disposition which, 
when held in common, comes to seem right, ethical, and therefore persuasive” (“The 
Ethos” 184, emphasis added; see also Carolyn Miller, “Technology” 228). The persuasive 
nature of ethos could be used to exploit others, as Scott Sanders unwittingly shows. He 
comments that “Persuasion based on the offer of social cooperation is not just an ethical 
way to play the game…. It is the name of the game. And it wins” (67). Here, Sanders 
simultaneously equates persuasion with ethicality as well as personal success, motives 
that may at times exclude one another. Communicators may want to create a social ethos, 
but if they do so for personal gain, they may not be acting ethically. When 
communicators use a socially constructed ethos as dialogic ethics in order to win over the 
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audience and achieve personal success, they are not adhering to nonfoundational 
ethical guidelines to treat others equitably and to determine values based on the common 
good.  
Such self-concerned persuasion violates one of Johannesen’s primary tenets of 
dialogic ethics: a spirit of mutual equality. Johannesen maintains that in dialogic ethics, 
“the exercise of power or superiority is to be avoided. Participants do not impose their 
opinion, cause, or will. In dialogic communication, agreement of the listener with the 
speaker’s aim is secondary to independent, self-deciding participation” (Ethics 46). 
Moreover, Johannesen specifically lists persuasion as incompatible with such an ethic 
(47).  
Granted, Johannesen admits that persuasion itself is inevitable and not harmful. 
He states, though, that “In dialogue, although interested in being understood, and perhaps 
in influencing, a speaker does not attempt to impose his own truth or view on another and 
he is not interested in bolstering his own ego or self-image” (“The Emerging” 375). As he 
explains it, such persuasion must not be selfish, a rule that modern technical 
communicator Scott Sanders appears to violate when he states that “The persuasive 
strategy is to encourage the reader to regard the writer as a similarly objective observer” 
(“How” 67). Although Sanders encourages the communicator to understand and work 
within the reader’s context (68), he undermines his statement by declaring that such 
techniques help the communicator “win” (67). The idea of “prevailing” suggests that the 
writer and reader are at odds, making the process competitive rather than cooperative. 
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Therefore, a communicator simply cannot give full, equitable expression to other 
voices and arrive at an ethical consensus if she is attempting to win them over to her own 
purposes, for her own gain.  
From the various limitations on dialogic ethics and social ethos, dialogic ethics is 
not truly nonfoundational. It has serious limitations and actually involves personal 
(sometimes foundational) values. Therefore, it needs to more completely address such 
issues.  
 
Professional Ethics 
If dialogic ethics seeks a nonfoundational basis by negotiating needs and values 
among society at large, professional ethics seeks that same negotiation only among 
members of the professional organization. In fact, many technical communicators 
endorse a formal, systematized statement on ethics, a professional code of conduct, which 
defines ethics for the field. Especially after 20th century ethical boggles such as 
Watergate, the Society for Technical Communication determined to write such a code to 
help communicators achieve “professional competence” (Schaefer 4). Arthur Walzer 
asserts that simply attempting to define and redefine such a code is ethical in itself 
because it spurs discussion and awareness of ethics (“Professional Ethics”), and most 
communicators would argue that our profession should foster competence and ethical 
inquiry. (See also Arnett 51.) 
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Perhaps the most powerful statement in favor of professional ethical standards 
and codes of conduct comes from Frank Radez. Radez explicitly states that the only ethic 
applicable to technical communication is a professional ethic, which would involve 
several components: 
1. Guidelines for the materials written (completeness, quality, accuracy). 
2. Guidelines for the way they are written (originality, methods). 
3. Guidelines for the relationships of those involved (writer to publisher, to 
superiors, to peers, to other professionals, and to subordinates). 5 
Radez also suggests itemized standards for the communicator’s semantics, mechanics, 
and methodology (5).  
Radez’s proposed professional ethic is nonfoundational because it is determined 
by members of the profession. Radez definitively denies that this ethic is foundational; he 
advocates it because technical communicators too often “confuse it [ethics] with morality 
and law” (6). Radez uses morality and law as universal standards, which are not the 
proper bases for ethics in technical communication. Instead, ethics for technical 
communicators should consist of guidelines that direct the communicator’s professional 
activities. These guidelines are determined by the communicators themselves. In fact, 
Radez proposes that the Society for Technical Communication (STC) poll its 
membership about their ethical needs and beliefs. Then, based upon the members’ 
professional ethical concerns, STC should have a code of ethics that accurately reflects 
the professional needs and values of its members. Then, technical communicators could 
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use this code to address their day-to-day ethical dilemmas. Ultimately, these 
standardized practices are measures of values and hence ethics: adhering to them is 
ethical, ignoring them is not. (See also Pitcairn.)  
Although Radez does not assert that a code of conduct would successfully address 
every ethical problem that the communicator might face, he does say that this 
professionally determined code is the only ethic a profession can attempt to mandate to 
its members. Since it is established by the professional community, it should reflect the 
values and needs of that community, which determines how to appropriate those values in 
the profession. (Kris Hartung explains that this professionally constructed mindset is the 
result of “groupthink” (369)—the tendency to succumb to job pressures and to assume 
the viewpoints and even ethical standards of those around us. This groupthink is 
inherently nonfoundational because it is socially constructed and changes from situation 
to situation and from group to group. See also Walzer, “Professional Ethics” and Weiss 
(172-74) for a discussion as to how professions such as law and business socially 
determine their own, profession-specific values and standards of ethics.) For example, in 
Radez’s ethic for technical communication, the ethical values of the community manifest 
themselves in quality control criteria and careful mechanics. Because the community 
determines its needs and values, it can alter its needs and values as the profession 
demands. Therefore, professional ethics and codes of conduct are contextual and 
nonfoundational.  
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David Russell likewise defends a professional ethic. He advises instructors in 
technical communication to disseminate this ethic because both professions and students 
expect them to do so (96, 100). Ultimately, he implies that instructors of technical 
communication owe their students and the profession an ethic that helps communicators 
to “learn the discourse of a community and thus become a part of that community…[and 
not to] challenge or resist the ethos and perhaps the ethics students are learning as part of 
their initiation into a professional community, as some in our discipline argue” (102). 
Russell’s proffered ethic is likewise determined by the profession: students should learn 
to accept the values of their profession and to follow the principles associated with those 
values.  
Admittedly, Russell does not state that this professional ethic will solve every 
ethical dilemma for every technical communicator. Neither does he assert that this 
professional ethic should serve as a moral basis for the communicator’s non-professional 
life. Still, he does affirm that the most effective ethics instructors can teach their students 
is one that fosters “a mutually respectful dialogue with professionals in the disciplines 
our students are preparing to enter” (107). Thus, this ethic is a determination among 
professionals as to what their professional values are and how they can best serve those 
values. As these examples illustrate, technical communication can employ professional 
nonfoundational ethics by allowing members of the professional community to determine 
their current needs and values, and adopting corresponding guidelines for ethics. 
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 As Carol Lipson avows, some degree of professional conformity is necessary in 
any field. She explains, “To enforce standards, a profession would want its practitioners 
to identify closely with the professional group, and its norms and procedures…. Since 
[technical communicators] are going to have to use language repeatedly in their practices, 
controls of language become natural vehicles for reinforcing values and for judging 
performance” (9). For example, Lipson shows how scientific writers must adhere to strict 
formats that privilege the results section, attempt to be objective, and use strings of nouns 
as modifiers. The field of scientific writing mandates such conventions to its writers to 
reinforce professional standards and conformity; these standards unify the field, 
prescribing actions, attitudes, and values to those within it. 
Using professional standards to specify values and ethics also manifests itself in 
what Steven Katz calls the “ethic of expediency.” This ethic requires the “objectivity, 
logic, and narrow focus” that characterize much technical writing and that most 
professional communication guidelines demand (257). Katz uses the ethic of expediency 
to examine a memo written about Nazi gassing buses. To his dismay, he finds that 
“Underlying the objectivity, detachment, and narrow focus of this memo…is an 
assurance that the writer’s ‘action’ is technically justified and correct, and thus morally 
right, an assurance that is grounded not in the arrogance of a personal belief in one’s 
superiority, but rather in a cultural and ethical norm of technology” (265, emphasis in 
original). Technical communicators are especially susceptible to this ethic of expediency 
because, as Carolyn Miller explains, technical communication sometimes demands an 
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efficiency that does not ask questions but simply seeks the right kinds of answers 
(Miller, “Technology” 233). (See also Hynds and Martin.) The ethic of expediency 
provides this efficiency because it commands strict adherence to communication 
guidelines.  
However, neither professional standards nor expediency fulfill one of the primary 
requirements of nonfoundational ethics: employing “necessary democratic procedures 
[such as] unrestricted debate and discussion; varied forms of public address, 
parliamentary procedure, and legal procedure; freedom of inquiry, criticism, and choice; 
and publicly defined rules of evidence and tests of reasoning” (Johannesen, Ethics 25). 
These ethical approaches do not allow the communicator (especially the neophyte) or 
other members of society (namely, those outside of the profession) to fully assert their 
personal moral codes. Of this phenomenon, though, David Russell states that there is 
“nothing sinister” about training students to promote the interests of the industries and 
individuals for whom they will one day work (90). Other scholars disagree.  
Thomas Miller warns that a “practical awareness” forces instructors to sacrifice 
theory for practice without questioning the assumptions behind those practices. This 
failure to understand motivation and the desire to concern themselves primarily with 
industry-accepted practices allow technical communicators to make uninformed decisions 
when they employ one of those practices. (See also Zerbe et al.) The tenets of 
nonfoundational ethics demand completely exposing all possible information, an 
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exposure that is limited if the communicator looks only to industry standards for 
ethical guidance.  
Using professional standards as ethical guidelines is also problematic because 
those standards do not allow people outside the profession to express completely their 
opinions and values. Nonfoundational ethics demands that each individual (regardless of 
profession) be treated equitably and her values considered. For example, Patricia Hynds 
and Wanda Martin explore how a public works department employed the professional 
ethic of expediency to communicate its desire to site a well in a predominantly Native 
American and Hispanic community in the Southwest. The public works department 
adhered strictly to its professional guidelines, doing what the industry considered ethical. 
It used scientific methods to determine the best site and, using standard procedures, 
proposed placing the well in that site. It followed the guidelines set by the profession, 
guidelines based in the profession’s needs and values. From the standpoint of 
professional ethics, the department acted ethically.  
However, members of the community felt alienated from the public works 
department and resented its standardized, bureaucratic rhetoric. They did not understand 
the department’s methods, and they felt alienated from the process of siting the well in 
their community. As a result, the community gained a legal injunction against the well, 
and the relationship between the community and the department was permanently 
damaged. In this case, the professional ethic was not truly nonfoundational because it did 
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not fully consider the opinions of everyone who might be involved in the decision. 
Because it ignored some people’s values, it was not successful.  
The public works department adhered to its professional ethic but apparently did 
not fully understand the limitations of that ethic. The department did not acknowledge the 
fact that a professional community’s values and standards may affect the values and 
standards of people outside of the community. Instead, the department allowed the 
professional ethic to serve as the primary ethic; the standards set by members of the 
profession became standards of ethics, of value, right and wrong. Since the department 
seemingly did not realize that professional standards may be inadequate, they 
communicated in ways that were not ethical (from a nonfoundational viewpoint). They 
privileged their own needs, values, and ethics as inherently more ethical—or at least 
more important—than the needs, values, and ethics of the community.  
The use of professional ethics is hardly restricted to communications departments 
within small government agencies, though. In fact, the Society for Technical 
Communication (STC), the largest professional organization for technical 
communicators, endorses its own nonfoundational code of ethics. This code reads, “As 
technical communicators, we observe the following ethical guidelines in our professional 
activities[:] Legality, Honesty, Confidentiality, Quality, Fairness, [and] Professionalism” 
(“Ethical”). The code then elaborates on how technical communicators can achieve each 
of these industry-approved ethical characteristics. Many scholars, such as William 
Buchholz, enthusiastically endorse such codes; Buchholz calls for more user-friendly 
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codes that communicators can utilize more frequently and completely. Frank Radez 
also defends such a professional ethic above all other ethical approaches for technical 
communicators. 
However, codes of conduct are not as effective as these scholars advance them to 
be. As Mike Markel explains, codes of conduct, including STC’s, are simply too vague to 
be of practical use to the average technical communicator (“A Basic” 216-17). For 
example, STC’s code calls for “professionalism” monitored by evaluations from others. 
However, it is doubtful that the typical technical communicator would be able to 
determine from this guideline how to act professionally (and hence ethically) in a 
meeting with new clients. What's more, Sam Dragga finds that technical communicators 
simply do not use codes of conduct as ethical principles on the job. While asking forty-
eight technical communicators to justify sample ethical decisions, Dragga found that 
none of them referred to a professional code of ethics or conduct (“A Question” 166). 
Another communicator, an ex-engineering writer, states that in his ten years on the job, 
he never saw a code of conduct and never heard his colleagues cite the code as a source 
of ethical instruction (Bryan 81). Therefore, although codes of conduct may be excellent 
methods of promoting professional competence and ethical study, evidence suggests that 
they are not practically useful.  
Unfortunately, though, many of the supporters of these codes, such as Radez, 
Russell, and Pitcairn, do not discuss such limitations of nonfoundational ethics. They do 
not offer technical communicators viable ethical alternatives for times when professional 
  
94
 
ethics cannot be practically implemented. Nor do they explain how to encourage 
communicators to become familiar with and utilize professional codes of ethics, except to 
learn them in the classroom, an approach that will not be helpful to communicators 
already on the workforce. Therefore, research in professional ethics needs to more 
completely address the imperfections of nonfoundational ethics and offer alternative 
(such as foundational) ethics to supplement it.  
 
Problems with Nonfoundational Ethical Theories 
When nonfoundational ethics does not fully disclose its shortcomings or offer 
other alternative ethical approaches (i.e., foundational ethics), it implies that those 
shortcomings are insignificant and that other ethical approaches are less important than 
nonfoundational ones. These implications make nonfoundational ethics seem thoroughly 
applicable in all situations, which it may not be. Admittedly, few scholars explicitly 
declare that nonfoundational ethics will serve technical communicators flawlessly in 
every situation. None proclaim nonfoundational ethics as faultless or allege that 
nonfoundational ethics should serve the technical communicator as exhaustively in her 
personal ethical dilemmas as in her professional ones. However, some proponents of 
nonfoundational ethics do not fully discuss the limitations of nonfoundational ethics and 
hence do not offer alternative ethical approaches. Therefore, they may unwittingly imply 
that technical communicators can use nonfoundational ethics exclusively and effectively 
in their professional ethical pursuits. Any such inferences can be dangerous, as I 
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illustrate, because they can ignore two very alarming problems in nonfoundational 
ethics: quashing individualism for the sake of consensus and conformity, and simply 
being impractical. 
Loss of individualism. One of the primary aims of nonfoundational ethics is to 
allow each individual voice to help construct values and ethics. However, to arrive at a 
socially constructed ethics, the community must agree somewhat upon its needs and 
values. As it negotiates these values, some opinions will be irreconcilable with the 
socially determined values. Then, the community will necessarily try to persuade the 
dissenters to accept the majority’s opinion. In doing so, if the community seeks 
unanimity and uniformity above all else, it loses sight of the individual. Of this problem, 
Gregory Clark asserts,  
[nonfoundational ethics] treats agreement as the primary collective good when 
it designates the elimination of disagreement as the end toward which the 
discourse community ought to be directed. The problem is that this ethics 
contradicts a democratic politics, a contradiction that is manifest when, in its 
drive toward agreement, a discourse overlooks, minimizes, or excludes 
difference. It does so by denying the presence of unresolved or unresolvable 
conflict, and denying in the process equal participation in the discourse to 
those who disagree. “Rescuing” 61 
Clark’s objection is especially true in dialogic ethics, which sometimes demands a social 
ethos of the communicator. The communicator must mediate values with her audience 
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and then use a persona that reflects and reinforces those needs. However, there may be 
some people who simply cannot reconcile themselves with the majority social opinion 
and the communicator’s ethos.  
For example, a technical communicator may have to decide how to portray 
typographically a warning about a new pesticide. So, to resolve this dilemma, she adopts 
a social ethos, imagining the needs and values of everyone she can perceive involved in 
the situation. She determines that her discourse community (primarily, the users of the 
pesticide) needs to be able to handle the pesticides safely and that they value a 
straightforward approach to corresponding safety instructions. Based on these socially 
constructed values, the communicator decides to place the warning prominently in large, 
red, Arial font. From a nonfoundational standpoint, she has made a good ethical decision. 
However, her very process of dialogic ethics has ignored one particular voice: the 
environmentalist who believes that a warning does not suffice for such a dangerous 
chemical and that the product should not be marketed. This voice represents what Clark 
calls the “unresolvable conflict,” a viewpoint not given “equal participation in the 
discourse.” Because the communicator focused on consensus and agreement, she may 
have been less able to acknowledge dissension, ignoring and perhaps devaluing the 
personal beliefs of individuals who disagree with certain socially constructed values.  
Likewise, professional ethics does not completely value the individual; instead, it 
privileges conformity to the group. Richard Johannesen argues that the attitudes of the 
communicator and audience toward one another are more important and ethical than the 
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message or the medium (“Emerging” 380). He contends that open human interaction is 
the most important ethical guideline. STC also seems to advance the ideal of personal 
interchange. Its code calls primarily for positive interaction between writers, clients, and 
employers. For example, the code demands “candid evaluations” of the communicator’s 
performance from others and respect for confidentiality. Such rules help produce honest 
interpersonal communication. Candid feedback allows one person to openly discuss 
others’ actions; it enables the communicator and her evaluators to decide upon acceptable 
practices. Confidentiality enables one party to trust another with sensitive information, 
allowing both to speak freely.  
However, if a profession prescribes human interaction as the primary ethical 
guideline, it takes from the individual her right to create and maintain her own value 
system. It mandates to the technical communicator that the highest ethical goal be candor 
and freedom of expression. Even though few communicators would argue against 
freedom and honesty in communication, most would not want an organization or industry 
to decree ethical priorities to them. (See Radez.) Actually, most communicators prefer to 
adhere to their own ethical prerogatives (Dragga, “Is”). 
For instance, an employer might ask a technical communicator to document the 
production of a specialized weapon. According to nonfoundational professional ethics, 
the communicator is ethical if she adheres to the profession’s edicts to document the 
weapon honestly, professionally, and confidentially, complying with legal and 
professional standards. In other words, if she fairly acknowledges the expectations of the 
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professional community and fulfills the community’s demands, she is acting ethically. 
However, if the communicator is a pacifist, she may not believe that she can help produce 
or distribute such a weapon. Strictly adhering to professional ethics might not allow her 
to act according to her personal convictions. In fact, if taken to the extreme, it may not 
even admit that such personal conflicts of interests are legitimate in the workplace. If 
professional ethics privileges professional guidelines over personal ones, it seriously 
limits the role of the communicator’s ethics in the workplace. If the communicator is not 
free to express her own needs and values, her individuality suffers. Ironically, it is this 
very individuality that nonfoundational ethics seeks to foster.  
Thus, a perfect consensus is nearly impossible. When research in nonfoundational 
ethics admits this problem, though, it usually does not offer the communicator sufficient 
advice on how to address the situation. It does not fully explain how consensus can 
actually hamper individuality. Assent at the expense of individualism can allow the 
community to devalue individuals, especially those holding minority opinions. It also can 
dictate personal ethics and prevent communicators from confronting differences that 
allow them to refine their own personal beliefs. As David Dobrin reminds us, consensus 
“doesn’t necessarily fit in the class of moral purposes” (155). Nonfoundational ethics in 
technical communication needs to acknowledge and explore how negotiation and 
consensus-building can stifle individualism; it should fully address the presence and 
importance of dissenting individual moral codes. 
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Impracticality. Any ethical approach must be practically applicable. However, 
nonfoundational ethical theories are largely unrealistic; most technical communicators 
could not effectively employ them in the workplace. For example, Johannesen exhorts 
that in dialogic ethics, “The exercise of power or superiority is avoided” (Ethics 46). That 
is, no one party should attempt to persuade others to accept its position uncritically. 
Every member of the discourse community should encourage a dialogue about the 
community’s needs and values in any given situation. When doing so, each should fully 
respect the divergent opinions of the others. However, this ideal social mediation is 
sometimes simply impossible for technical communicators.  
For example, while drafting a report recommending changes to an aircraft, a 
communicator may survey the affected parties, determine their needs and values, and 
then adopt an ethos (and related ethics) that reflects those social exigencies. However, if 
one of the affected parties is the US government, the communicator will be under intense 
pressure to prefer the needs of the government over the needs of the other parties. 
Because the government likely brandishes more power than the other groups or 
individuals involved, the communicator may succumb to its demands above all others. In 
doing so, she allows power and pressure to color her ethical decision, a concession that 
violates the nonfoundational requirement for open, uncoerced expression. Moreover, if 
the communicator privileges powerful entities over less-powerful ones, she unwittingly 
declares power itself an ethic: “good” is whatever the most powerful force says it is. 
Because such an ethic could ignore the values of others—even the majority—to appease 
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authority, it could actually harm more people than it helps. (See also Carolyn Miller, 
“Rhetoric” 91.) The ideology that dialogic ethics necessitates can be simply impossible 
given the inevitable hierarchy in which technical communicators function. (See also 
Jensen 32-33.) 
This inequality of power and the subsequent failure of nonfoundational ethics is 
even more pronounced in professional ethics or codes of conduct. As Shimberg and 
others prove, individuals do not carry equal power, and when conflicts arise, the party 
with the most power almost inevitably prevails. As he explains, the technical 
communicator is usually not one of these most powerful figures. Patrick Moore agrees: 
“Because of pressures in the marketplace, if technical professionals disagree bluntly with 
the…most powerful members of their social group, they will be fired or sanctioned” 
(“When” 273). (See also Barabas.) Technical communicators generally answer to 
supervisors, and in any workplace, employees must act deferentially toward their 
superiors. Such deference does not promote a true discourse (Herndl et al 286). If the 
communicator’s professional ethic (as established by STC) conflicts with her supervisor’s 
professional ethic (as established by business guidelines or a particular corporation), the 
communicator’s ethic will probably not prevail.  
For instance, a communicator editing a sales brochure may not believe that the 
brochure accurately reflects the product’s capabilities. The brochure states that the 
product functions under all weather conditions, but the communicator knows that it 
quickly breaks down when exposed to excessive moisture. After reviewing STC’s ethical 
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code, she decides that the brochure’s statement violates her professional obligation to 
communicate honestly, so she changes it. Her supervisor, however, insists that the 
communicator restore the original statement for marketing reasons. The professional 
ethics of technical communication demands that the communicator not back down. 
However, her supervisor—who may or may not be a technical communicator herself—
believes that the communicator’s utmost responsibility and primary discourse community 
is the company itself, not STC. How does the communicator resolve the dilemma? 
First, she can defy her superior and risk losing her position. Second, she can 
redefine her discourse community and, thus, her ethical obligations. If she accepts this 
second option, though, she forsakes the technical communicator’s code of ethics in favor 
of another professional code. Because technical communicators are rarely the most 
powerful parties in their workplaces, they may not be able to exert the power necessary to 
convince those around and above them that the professional ethic to which they should 
adhere is a technical communication ethic or code. 
Moreover, some technical communicators may believe that their first priority is to 
a group other than STC, such as their employer. In this case, the communicator may 
prefer the corporation’s code of conduct over STC’s. There is no guarantee that the 
communicator can or would promote a technical communication code of ethics. That is 
not to say that STC should not develop such a code. A code of conduct spurs discussion 
of ethics, and being aware of and involved in matters of ethics can be ethical itself. (See 
beginning of this chapter.) Still, though, professional ethics is not always very viable. 
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(For other problems with nonfoundational ethics, see also Kent and Weiss.) When it 
is impractical, technical communicators need alternative ethical approaches (such as 
foundational ethics) to complement nonfoundational ethics. 
 
The Need for Foundational Considerations in Nonfoundational 
Ethics 
As these examples explain, nonfoundational ethics is problematic. Neither 
dialogic nor professional ethics is entirely nonfoundational, and both approaches forsake 
individualism and practicality for idealism and moral relativism. (See, for example, Allen 
and Voss, who briefly outline the dangers of nonfoundational ethics and moral relativism 
(“Ethics for Editors” 58) before quickly returning to the benefits of nonfoundational 
ethics.) Since nonfoundational philosophies cannot operate by themselves, as sole 
methods of ethical deliberation, technical communicators need to consider other 
approaches as well, approaches that research in nonfoundational ethics sometimes 
ignores. Scott Sanders acknowledges the need for supplementary ethics: “it is hard to feel 
confident that [some very] foundational evils are effectively countered without appealing 
to foundational ethical tenets” (“Technical” 113). Therefore, communicators need to 
combine the beneficial aspects of nonfoundational ethics with the beneficial aspects of 
other ethics (especially foundational ethics). Doing so will provide a fuller, more 
complete ethics of technical communication.  
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Chapter Five: Contextual Foundational 
Ethics 
  
Neither foundational nor nonfoundational ethics is perfect for every ethical 
problem in technical communication. Both approaches have serious limitations. 
However, a combination foundational and nonfoundational ethic perhaps could give 
technical communicators a more complete ethical framework, one that might help 
alleviate some of the problems inherent in the individual approaches. I call this ethic 
contextual foundational because it acknowledges and works with foundational ethical 
values but does so through a (nonfoundational) contextual process of negotiation. This 
ethic is what Mike Markel advances in “Ethics and Technical Communication: A Case 
for Foundational Approaches,” although he does not use the term “contextual 
foundational.” Markel states, “My approach is to consider issues that derive from 
foundational ethical approaches, but to carry out the decision-making process within a 
communicative [nonfoundational, contextual] ethics framework” (293). In short, Markel 
proposes an ethic that fully acknowledges and embraces both foundational and 
nonfoundational ethics. (For other, though less well-defined examples of ethics that treat 
foundational and nonfoundational ethics relatively equally, see also Chesebro110-14; 
Clark 68-73; Halloran; Hartung; Martin and Sanders; Thomas Miller; Ornatowski; 
Thomas and Olsen.) 
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Markel’s (Contextual Foundational) Ethic 
Markel recommends communicative (dialogic) ethics as the contextual basis for 
his (contextual foundational) ethic. Admittedly, one cannot ignore the nonfoundational 
professional ethic, which undoubtedly can affect the communicator’s ethical decisions. 
The successful communicator cannot ignore professional concerns and demands. Such 
standards help the communicator to understand her role and to become a more productive 
member of the profession. Still, professional ethics is only one aspect of nonfoundational 
ethics.  
Dialogic ethics more fully reflects the spirit of nonfoundational ethics because it 
is more inclusive. Nonfoundational ethics requires that all opinions related to a given 
situation (the opinions of everyone in the discourse community) be stated, equitably 
explored, and negotiated. These negotiations yield a set of needs, which determines 
values, which determines ethics. A simple-minded focus on professional ethics, though, 
reduces the discourse community to just technical communicators. It focuses on the 
needs, values, and ethics of the profession, which can allow the profession to ignore the 
opinions of outsiders. Although the values and opinions of the field of technical 
communication do play into nonfoundational ethics, they are not the only values and 
opinions that the communicator must consider. Dialogic ethics allows the communicator 
to more fully negotiate with society about needs and values because it allows her to 
recognize more and more divergent points of view. Since dialogic ethics appears to be a 
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more thorough nonfoundational approach, I focus on dialogic ethics as the contextual 
basis for contextual foundational ethics.  
Dialogic ethics is the first step in the contextual foundational ethical framework. 
To implement dialogic ethics, the communicator polls others in her discourse community 
to determine their needs and values. Then she negotiates with them, weighing the 
different beliefs against one another and against her own opinions. She uses this social 
feedback to help decide what ethical issues are involved in the situation, which are most 
pressing, and how they may be addressed. “Obviously,” Markel states in reference to this 
process, “you should consult with as broad a range of others as possible when 
confronting an ethics problem. This consultation might take a number of forms, from 
one-to-one dialogues to focus groups to formal meetings” (293). Whatever its form, this 
step in contextual foundational ethics is dialogic. It requires the communicator 
respectfully to mediate with others to uncover society’s current needs and values. Doing 
so enables the communicator to consider social values in her ethical decision-making 
process.  
Markel concedes that this open, uncoerced communication will be impossible in 
most cases; still, he urges communicators to engage with others as completely as possible 
to determine and implement ethical solutions. Doing so trains the communicator to 
employ ethics as fully as she can, and it keeps her from trying to solve a difficult problem 
“in isolation”:  
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Just as collaboration in writing is likely to improve a document’s quality 
because the authors will have more information and insights to work with, 
collaboration in thinking through an ethics problem will help you see 
shortcomings in your reasoning, as well as help you understand perspectives 
you might not have considered otherwise. 293  
Granted, Markel does not advocate an entirely nonfoundational ethic. He does not 
deny, as do strictly nonfoundational ethics, that there are certain universal and 
unchanging ethical values. He also does not insist that society’s needs and values are 
always the best bases for ethics in any situation. Instead, he offers a form of dialogic 
ethics that civilly considers each person and opinion. This dialogic ethic is open because 
it requests criticism and assistance from others. In this way, it is nonfoundational. It helps 
to “create an atmosphere in which people treat one another—and, by extension, their 
views—respectfully” (293), and that respect is the basis for the dialogic aspect of 
contextual foundational ethics. 
This dialogic ethics is only the first step in contextual foundational ethics, though. 
Next, Markel stipulates that the communicator employ foundational values. He suggests 
either Kantian ethics or utilitarianism as the foundational bases for his ethical framework. 
However, I amend Markel’s ethic on this position by focusing primarily on Kantian 
ethics instead of utilitarianism. I do so because Kantian ethics is slightly less problematic 
than utilitarian ethics since Kantian ethics is less product-oriented and demands both 
ethical means and ends. (See Chapter Three.) Moreover, Kantian ethics can embody 
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other foundational approaches such as honesty, e.g., if a communicator values 
honesty, she might wish that a standard of truthfulness be universalized according to the 
categorical imperative. Hence, Kantian ethics would not exclude some humanitarian 
values, such as honesty. Naturally, it is important to fully explore each foundational ethic 
and to examine its role and applicability in any given ethical dilemma. However, of the 
three foundational ethics I have surveyed, Kantian ethics least excludes other approaches, 
so I focus on it as the foundational portion of contextual foundational ethics. 
Using this amendment to Markel’s ethic, then, once the communicator has 
negotiated with others, gaining their insights into the ethical dilemma, she should employ 
foundational Kantian ethics. The communicator uses the input of others to determine the 
ethical issues included in her current situation: What might be the ramifications of her 
actions? Whom might her actions affect? With these socially determined questions in 
mind, the communicator can utilize Kantian ethics to help determine the most ethical 
action. She has a better understanding of what questions to ask of Kantian ethics: Which 
of the ramifications of my actions should I want universalized? Which actions would 
most fully treat others as ends in themselves and not means to ends? Thus, the 
communicator uses foundational Kantian ethics to weight and implement the values that 
she and her discourse community have identified.  
To illustrate how the communicator employs such foundational values, Markel 
uses the example of a communicator whose supervisor has asked her to write a false 
statement about a product (294). Using the categorical imperative, the communicator 
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might ask herself, “Can I wish that everyone in my situation engage in this action that 
does not fully value honesty?” Since she probably could not wish that everyone in her 
situation write dishonestly, she cannot universalize her actions. The action is not fully 
ethical from a Kantian perspective. Second, she might ask herself if the dishonest 
statement would treat readers as means to an end rather than as ends in themselves. Since 
the false statement probably treats people as means to an end—profit—it is again 
unethical from a Kantian perspective (294). Thus, the communicator uses Kantian 
precepts to determine her ethical obligations  
However, Markel also admits that the communicator may not be able to act 
according to Kantian ethics in this situation because “it is unlikely that the communicator 
could persuade the manager to change his or her mind” (294). The manager wields more 
power than the communicator, so the communicator’s commitment to Kantian ethics 
likely will be subjugated by the manager’s values. When the communicator is in such 
ethical gridlock, Markel suggests reexamining contextual foundational ethics by asking 
questions such as 
[D]oes the employer have a right to compel the communicator to follow 
orders or be fired? In terms of ethics, no, although legally the answer is less 
clear. Does the communicator have a right to do what he or she feels is 
appropriate, even if the employer forbids it? Probably not. Does the 
communicator have the right to go to the organization’s ombudsperson or seek 
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arbitration in some other way? Yes. Does the communicator have the right 
to blow the whistle if the situation is serious…? Yes. 294-95 
These questions can determine her (nonfoundational) social responsibilities and her 
(foundational) personal ones. They allow her to reexamine her ethical decisions 
continually, which is what Markel claims is the hallmark of a good ethical framework.  
No system of ethics will always yield completely ethical results, and Markel does 
not imply that contextual foundational ethics is any exception. Still, he advances it as a 
more complete ethical framework. Its nonfoundational characteristics help the 
communicator to ascertain what ethical questions are relevant in a given situation, what 
her options are, and what the ramifications of those options might be. The foundational 
characteristics help her to determine which options are most ethical and if she can 
implement them. Most importantly, though, these two approaches complement rather 
than undermine one another. As I show later in this chapter, dialogic ethics makes 
Kantian ethics more socially responsible; Kantian ethics makes dialogic ethics more 
viable. And each makes the other more complete.  
 
Examining Contextual Foundational Ethics 
As Mike Markel explains, contextual foundational ethics offers many benefits. 
More specifically to our purposes, though, contextual foundational ethics alleviates many 
of the problems that I have discussed so far, problems that emerge when communicators 
fail fully to consider either foundational or nonfoundational approaches. I do not suggest 
  
110
 
that contextual foundational ethics is for technical communicators, nor do I propose 
that it solves all of the problems of either individual approach. However, I do 
demonstrate that contextual foundational ethics could help lessen some of the problems 
that arise when technical communicators rely too heavily on one approach and neglect to 
treat the other fully. 
To help illustrate how contextual foundational ethics can help alleviate certain 
problems, I use a dramatic example from technical communication: the disaster of the 
space shuttle Challenger. (On January 28, 1986, seventy-three seconds into its flight, the 
space shuttle Challenger exploded due to a booster problem. The incident was one of the 
most disastrous events for both America and NASA, especially since the flight crew was 
one of the most racially diverse ever and because it was to be the first time a civilian had 
been on a mission (“Challenger”; “Challenger Disaster”).) As I show, communications 
surrounding the Challenger disaster offer excellent practical examples of how technical 
communicators could have used contextual foundational ethics to arrive at more complete 
ethical approaches to their problems. To this end, I explore how some of the ethical 
decisions that communicators made reflect either foundational or nonfoundational ethical 
values.  
I do not attempt to show that the communicators involved in the Challenger 
incident actually employed a particular ethic or ignored another. I also do not endeavor to 
analyze completely the communications problems that contributed to the disaster; such a 
task is well beyond the scope of my project. All I aim to do is illustrate briefly—with a 
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very few, select examples—how communications about the Challenger prior to its 
explosion could be viewed as the results of ethics that relied too heavily on exclusively 
foundational or nonfoundational precepts. In doing so, I take the problems of 
foundational and nonfoundational ethics to the extreme, giving worst-case scenarios for 
both ethical approaches. However, I believe that the extreme results of the 
communication failures surrounding the Challenger permit extreme analyses, especially 
if an understanding of the worst possible results can help communicators avoid such 
problems in the future.  
Based on the characteristics of the communicators’ actions and words, and on the 
documented facts surrounding the Challenger, I hypothesize as to how the 
communicators themselves might have been influenced primarily by either foundational 
or nonfoundational ethics. Naturally, no one except the individual communicators can 
testify as to their ethical motivations for their decisions. I simply give examples from the 
Challenger to show how problems characteristic of primarily foundational or 
nonfoundational ethics can be taken to the extreme and can result in serious 
communication problems. Then, I quickly explore how contextual foundational ethics 
might have given the communicators a fuller ethical approach. I in no way posit that 
contextual foundational ethics could have prevented the Challenger disaster, but I do 
attempt to prove how it could have offered a more complete ethics that might have 
allowed communicators to acknowledge ethical dilemmas and possible solutions more 
completely.  
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Explanation of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Physically, the 
space shuttle Challenger disaster resulted from charred O-rings. Dorothy A. Winsor 
describes the material basis for the accident this way: 
The physical cause of the Challenger explosion was the failure of a rubber seal 
in the solid rocket booster…. These solid rocket boosters (SRBs) were made 
in segments which were stacked together at the launch site. The joints 
between the segments were sealed with two O-rings, which were protected 
from the heat of combustion by putty. The joint was pressure sealed, meaning 
that during rocket firing, expanding gases from burning fuel pushed the putty 
into the air space in the joint; this compressed air, in turn, pushed the O-ring 
into place and held it there…. During the Challenger launch, the O-rings in 
one of the SRB joints failed to seal, allowing hot gases to escape from the side 
of the SRB and burn a hole into the nearby liquid fuel tank, which exploded 
approximately 73 seconds into the flight. 102 
However, more thorough investigations into the disaster show that the communication 
process involved in evaluating and conveying information about the O-rings was as much 
at fault for the disaster as were the O-rings themselves (Dombrowski; Herndl et al; 
Moore; Riley; Walzer and Gross; Winsor).  
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Alleviating Nonfoundational Ethics’ Lack of Emphasis on the 
Individual 
 
First, nonfoundational ethics can limit the role of the individual in making ethical 
decisions. It can fail to admit fully the communicator’s individuality—her important role 
in resolving ethical dilemmas and the role of her personal ethics in determining and 
implementing ethical options. However, contextual foundational ethics may mitigate this 
problem. Because contextual foundational ethics has foundational characteristics, it 
admits that the communicator is importantly involved in making ethical decisions and 
that her involvement might be colored by her own (perhaps foundational) ethics.  
First, the individual has a very important role in the decision-making process; it is 
the communicator herself who must implement Kantian ethics (or any other foundational 
ethic). In his limited version of contextual foundational ethics, James Porter claims that 
“such an ethic would not deny the validity of individual ethical responsibility—but it 
would insist that ethical responsibility…must be shared” (“The Role” 132). In this ethic, 
then, the individual is accountable for initiating and executing ethical decision-making 
processes.  
Moreover, nonfoundational ethics sometimes fails to acknowledge that the 
communicator’s personal ethics are integral to her ethical decisions. In contextual 
foundational ethics, though, the inclusion of foundational principles demands that we 
recognize how the communicator’s individual ethics plays into her decision-making 
processes. As Kris Hartung states, a complete ethic must recognize “that personal values 
and feelings are worth considering when thinking about morality” (383). (See also 
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Faber.) To this end, Mike Markel cites Stephen Toulmin, who states that “the best we 
can achieve in practice is for good-hearted, clear-headed people to triangulate their way 
across the complex terrain of moral life and problems” (296, emphasis added). As 
Toulmin shows, the role of the individual’s ethic is important in how she handles 
professional ethical problems. Toulmin advocates good-heartedness and clear-
headedness, attributes that reflect an earnest desire to be and do “good.” They are 
personal ethical qualities. Of course, the communicator must carefully check her personal 
morality to ensure that her decisions are not self-serving, a task that is encouraged 
through dialogic collaboration with others in her discourse community. Still, contextual 
foundational ethics does not deny that the individual’s ethics plays into her ethical 
decisions.  
Furthermore, nonfoundational ethics does not always fully admit that the 
individual’s values might be foundational and that foundational ethics are therefore 
important in any system of ethics. In calling for a redefinition of (that is, a more 
contextual foundational) ethics, Thomas Miller promotes an awareness of morality that 
“can empower individuals by helping them discover how to use traditional values and 
assumptions that are put into practice within organizations and disciplines” (69, emphasis 
added). As Miller illustrates, the ethics that individuals use are often “traditional” or well-
established ones. Thus, the personal morality that participates in the communicator’s 
ethic is often a traditional or foundational one, often guided by deeply ingrained religious 
or humanitarian—that is, foundational—values.  
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The communicator therefore must be aware of her own ethical values and 
“develop ways to monitor and critique” them (Faber 200). Because the individual’s 
morality plays into her ethical decision-making processes, contextual foundational ethics 
cannot ignore individual values and beliefs. Instead, it acknowledges individual ethics, 
and by acknowledging it, allows the communicator to check it. The communicator herself 
should be educated and trained to act ethically (Markel 295; Faber 201). In particular, she 
should learn to critique her own ethical values. Thus, contextual foundational ethics 
places a great deal of responsibility on the individual and her personal moral code. 
How the Challenger incident could reflect nonfoundational ethics that does 
not fully admit individuality. In the accident involving the space shuttle Challenger, 
some of the ethical decision-making seems to reflect the values of nonfoundational 
ethics, but that ethic does not seem to fully and consistently admit the important role of 
the individual and her personal values in the decision-making process. For example, both 
MTI and NASA had extensive guidelines for testing flightworthiness. They were 
fastidious in implementing a set of procedures for determining the safety of shuttle flights 
(Dombrowski, “Can Ethics” 147). MTI repeatedly tested the SRBs and O-rings, and 
NASA ran numerous test flights with the charred O-rings. Both required careful 
documentation of these tests. These procedures and standards can be viewed as measures 
of professional ethics. They were accepted practices based upon the organizations’ 
values, and they set forth “right” or ethical behaviors. From a professional ethical 
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viewpoint, the individual communicator simply had to implement these values; her 
personal convictions supposedly did not come into play.  
However, as Paul Dombrowski explains, personal principles were extremely 
important in the communication surrounding the Challenger accident, a fact that 
professional ethics and the “technologizing” of ethics often denies. “Repeatedly [in the 
Challenger incident],” he states, “key decisions show that personal decision-making was 
much more important than impersonal procedural decision-making” (“Can Ethics” 148). 
Although comprehensive nonfoundational professional standards were in place, personal 
values often guided ethical decisions. Unfortunately, though, some of the communicators 
in connection with the Challenger disaster seem to have assumed that professionalism—
not personal values—was guiding ethical decisions. As a result, they did not fully 
consider the role of the individual communicator in the ethical decision-making process 
nor did they see any need to help refine the communicator’s personal ethical beliefs.  
Dombrowski discusses the danger of viewing ethics as adherence to industry-set 
guidelines (what he calls the “technologizing” of ethics) and how it can ignore the 
important role of the communicator and her personal morality. He uses the example of 
Lawrence Mulloy, a NASA manager. Mulloy claimed that he notified numerous people at 
NASA of the dangerous O-rings. However, he did not mention the O-ring problems in 
any of his flight-readiness statements, which NASA uses to document launch problems 
and to which NASA refers when making official decisions about flightworthiness (“Can 
Ethics” 148). Dombrowski concludes that Mulloy’s personal decision not to document 
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his reservations “shows that procedures operate only derivatively on the basis of 
written inputs, [which] might not reflect the whole decision-making process” (293). The 
portion of the decision-making process that was seemingly omitted was the individual’s 
personal values. In spite of professional standards, Mulloy apparently used his personal 
judgment to decide not to put into print any qualms about the Challenger’s readiness for 
flight. Personal values seemed to have played an integral part in Mulloy’s decision 
making, but Mulloy may not have been able to recognize his personal values or may have 
sacrificed personal concerns for what he believed to be professional good (launching on 
schedule). Whatever the case, Mulloy needed to fully understand the ramifications of his 
personal values and decisions—even in professional ethics.  
How contextual foundational ethics could have alleviated this problem. 
Contextual foundational ethics might have helped to assuage this problem by allowing 
Mulloy to acknowledge more fully the role of his personal values upon his professional 
ethical decisions. In contextual foundational ethics, the individual must be aware of her 
own personal values so that she does not consider them above others’ values and must 
constantly analyze her personal ethics.  
First, the communicator must understand that she herself is responsible for ethical 
decision-making, for becoming personally involved in and accountable for her actions. 
This culpability does not deny that others in the discourse community contribute to 
ethical decisions. Rather, it forces the communicator to become aware that professional 
standards do not excuse her from personal ethical involvement or responsibility. 
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Professionalism merely helps guide her ethical deliberations. Next, the communicator 
must admit that her personal ethics will likely influence her decision-making, so she must 
be aware of her values and continually examine her decisions to see how they are based 
upon her personal beliefs. Although she need not change her personal moral code, she 
must try to understand and scrutinize her own values because otherwise they will affect 
her ethical decision-making without her knowledge of it. 
In Dombrowski’s example, perhaps Mulloy could have acted more ethically if he 
had employed contextual foundational ethics. Doing so might have helped him to 
determine if he was being influenced by personal values and, if so, how he might have 
critiqued them and revised them if necessary. For some reason, Mulloy chose to use 
verbal rather than written warnings. What personal values affected his decision to do so? 
Did Mulloy personally value expedient delivery of his warning? Perhaps that value 
played into his resolution to use verbal warnings, which might spread throughout NASA 
more quickly than written ones. Did Mulloy value workplace harmony? If so, perhaps he 
believed that spreading a verbal warning would be less disruptive to his workplace than 
documenting a warning that could upset his supervisors, especially given their need to see 
the Challenger off on time. Whatever the motivation, Mulloy’s decision not to write 
down his reservations seems incongruous with the professional standards that were in 
place, standards which demanded that any such possible problems be documented. It is 
likely, then, that Mulloy’s personal values guided his decision.  
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Perhaps if Mulloy had been more aware of his personal values, he could have 
questioned their legitimacy. He could have asked himself, for example, “Why am I 
making the decision not to document my reservations?” Asking this type of question 
might have allowed Mulloy to understand more fully his personal motivations and how 
they were affecting his ethical decision-making. If he found that he did not document the 
problems in order to preserve accord in his workplace, he might ask himself “Does my 
value of workplace harmony conflict with others’ values?” and “If so, does my value of 
workplace harmony more fully reflect Kantian ethics than others’ values?” These 
questions might have allowed him to determine if and to what extent his personal values 
should be allowed to influence his ethical decisions. 
With this understanding, perhaps Mulloy might have found what the 
Congressional committee investigating the disaster did: “[A] process is only as effective 
as the responsible individuals make it” (qtd. in Dombrowski, “Can Ethics” 148, emphasis 
Dombrowski’s). That is, a set of professional procedures (no matter how comprehensive) 
is no substitute for personal decision-making; individuals must make ethical decisions 
and take ethical responsibility. They are inseparable from the ethical decision-making 
process, and their values are inseparable from them. Thus, as contextual foundational 
ethics asserts, it is each individual’s responsibility to become aware of and critique her 
personal code of ethics.  
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Alleviating Foundational Ethics’ Over-reliance on the Individual  
Whereas nonfoundational ethics do not allow the individual to fully explore her 
personal morality, foundational ethics can force her to employ personal ethics at the 
expense of others’ values and ethics. For example, theories of foundational ethics often 
do not explain how the communicator determines universal values; instead, they assume 
that the communicator will make such decisions intuitively. Doing so makes the 
communicator alone responsible for ethical judgments. However, contextual foundational 
ethics mitigates this problem somewhat because it has dialogic characteristics that call for 
the communicator to more fully consider others in her decision-making process.  
For example, according to Markel’s description, contextual foundational ethics 
begins with the communicator collaborating with others to uncover her ethical options. In 
other words, the communicator begins by employing dialogic ethics, which helps her 
determine what the ethical questions are so she can seek ethical answers. This social 
interaction is a very fundamental obligation in contextual foundational ethics. As Gregory 
Clark explains, ethics “must take the form of a response that begins with an open 
consideration of how [the] other’s conception of the good, as that other has articulated it, 
might infect my own” (“Rescuing” 69, emphasis added). Thus, the communicator begins 
contextual foundational ethics by exploring the values of those around her and of those 
who might be influenced by her decision. She surveys their needs and concerns, weighs 
them against her own, and then decides what ethical options are available to her. Only 
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then—once she has a full slate of options—can she choose the most ethical course of 
action.  
What’s more, using dialogic ethics in conjunction with foundational ethics does 
more than augment the role of others in ethical decision-making; it can actually clarify 
the communicator’s role in the process. As Thomas Miller explains,  
[we must understand] the basic problems that constitute a specific discourse 
community, and we should encourage students to explore how those central 
problematic issues are reflected in the theoretical assumptions, technical 
methods, and social practices of that community…. When students have a 
broader perspective on the problematic issues and situations that the 
community is organized around, they become aware of their own place in 
[it]…and can then ask themselves if that is how they want to do things and 
how they want to express themselves in the things they do. 70  
Dialogic ethics is recursive. Whenever a communicator examines the ethics of 
others, she develops a backdrop against which to examine her own ethical beliefs. With 
this increasingly refined backdrop, she can begin to understand her own ethic more 
clearly and change it when necessary. Thus, the nonfoundational aspect of contextual 
foundational ethics strengthens the role of both the individual and society in the ethical 
decision-making process. Contextual foundational ethics more completely approaches 
what David Sturges encourages: a moral framework that requires decisions to be equally 
“acceptable under constraints imposed by internal predisposition to judge goodness or 
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badness [and]…under constraints imposed by external cultures…and [by] the 
formalized rules of behavior defined by society, the organization, or the cultural group” 
(44). 
How the Challenger incident could reflect foundational ethics that puts too 
much weight on the individual’s ethics. MTI not only manufactured and tested the 
SRBs and O-rings used by NASA but also reported to NASA that appropriate sealing of 
the O-rings was questionable. From observations, though, the engineers neglected to 
consider the needs and values of others in their discourse community, such as how they 
could most effectively convey their concerns to NASA. In other words, they earnestly 
appeared to have worked in accordance with their own ethical obligations, but they did so 
without considering the needs and values of others within their discourse community, 
such as the managers at NASA.  
During a meeting with NASA, “the engineers argued from extensive experience 
in handling the failed parts, while [NASA] management argued from experience with 
flight records and program needs” (Herndl et al 300-01). In explaining the dangers of the 
flight, a top engineering expert remarked, “‘I sincerely hope that this launch does not 
result in a catastrophy [sic]’” (qtd. in Herndl et al). This same expert maintained, 
“‘[During the meeting,] I went up and discussed the photos once again and tried to make 
the point that it was my opinion from actual observations that temperature was a 
discriminator…. I also stopped when it was apparent that I couldn’t get anybody to 
listen”’ (qtd. in Herndl et al 302). However, this engineer was not unsuccessful because 
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he was an unethical agent. He appears to have been unsuccessful because he did not 
incorporate the needs and values of his discourse community into the processes of 
making and presenting his ethical decision. 
As some scholars in technical communication explain, MTI engineers could not 
make NASA managers understand the import of their concerns because the managers 
needed a communication that focused on the results of the charred O-rings; what the 
engineers delivered were the causes (Dombrowski; Walzer and Gross; Herndl et al 296-
303). By looking at the results, the managers found that accepting the engineers’ 
recommendations would result in another flight delay. As Herndl, Fennell, and Miller 
explain, “[The MTI engineers] reasoned from causes at the level of physical detail—
charring and erosion of O-rings. The managers reasoned from results at the level of 
contracts and programs—successful flights” (302, emphasis in original). Since the 
managers were already under intense pressure to see the Challenger off on schedule, this 
result was undesirable. The managers also looked at the results of proceeding flights with 
charred O-rings; they found that similar flights with similar O-rings had resulted in 
successful flights. Because one of the managers’ primary values was timeliness, and 
because they determined this value from results rather than causes, they might not have 
completely appreciated the engineers’ presentation of the causes of O-ring failure. The 
managers needed the engineers to state explicitly that the flight would result in a failure 
using the current O-rings.  
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How contextual foundational ethics could have alleviated this problem. In 
the example of the shuttle Challenger, contextual foundational ethics could have 
provided a more complete ethical approach. Using contextual foundational ethics, the 
engineers at MTI could have realized that, in spite of their best personal ethical 
intentions, the NASA managers might not understand and appreciate their ethical 
reasoning. What the engineers needed was a more complete dialogic approach to the 
situation: an ethic that more fully considered the needs, values, and ethics of those 
involved in the decision-making process.  
Instead of simply giving recommendations to the to the managers, the engineers 
could have collaborated with them. By employing aspects of dialogic ethics, they might 
have found that the managers were under intense pressure not to delay the flight (Markel, 
“A Case” 291). Thus, the managers’ needs and values were inherently different from 
those of the engineers, who advocated deferring take-off. With this knowledge, the 
engineers might have understood that they needed to negotiate more persuasively with 
the managers’ value of timeliness. The engineers might have found that they could offer 
courses of action other than seriously delaying the flight. A more dialogic decision 
perhaps could have satisfied the engineers’ ethical obligation to recommend against using 
the charred O-rings for the January 1986 flight but might also have reflected an 
understanding of the managers’ need to stay on schedule. The engineers might have more 
fully considered the values of others and might have been able to convince others to 
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accept their ethical decisions, thus uncovering the discourse community’s “better 
reasons for assent” (Walzer and Gross 426). 
Moreover, the engineers needed to realize the values and opinions of their larger 
discourse community, including the astronauts themselves. The values of the MTI 
engineers and the NASA managers were likely different from those of the astronauts 
themselves, who had a deep investment in their personal safety and a safe flight. If the 
communicators could have more fully understood the values of these members of their 
discourse community—the astronauts—they would have had another important set of 
ethics to negotiate with before arriving at a course of action. Therefore, if the 
communicators had more fully admitted the role of a diverse discourse community—each 
with needs and values that must be critiqued—they might have chosen ethical decisions 
that more fully implemented the needs of others. 
 
Alleviating Foundational Ethics’ Dependence on Ends  
Next, foundational ethics sometimes focuses too narrowly on the end result of 
ethical deliberation. Especially in utility- and truth-based foundational value systems, the 
communicator is supposed to achieve a utilitarian or truthful good—an end—using 
whatsoever means necessary. When foundational ethics is combined with 
nonfoundational ethics, though, this problem is allayed somewhat because 
nonfoundational ethics forces the communicator to engage in a process of determining 
and evaluating ethical options in conjunction with others in the discourse community. 
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Contextual foundational ethics would be most effective in assuaging this 
problem if it used Kantian ethics, which is not teleological—that is, mandating ends 
without means. Instead, Kantian ethics is deontological—it prescribes a foundational 
process of ethical inquiry, by its very nature forcing the communicator to consider the 
means as well as the ends of her ethical decisions. (See Sturges.) Since Kantian ethics is 
deontological, using it as the foundational basis for contextual foundational would 
necessarily ease the problem of focusing on ends over means. 
More importantly, though, contextual foundational ethics could help 
communicators concentrate on processes as well as products because it is contextual and 
includes aspects of dialogic ethics. Dialogic ethics requires that the communicator 
negotiate with others in her discourse community to decide what ethical issues to 
consider, what her options are, and if and how she can implement those options. By 
forcing the communicator to engage in such dialogic ethics, contextual foundational 
ethics allows her to engage more fully in a process of ethical inquiry. It enables her to 
explore how she makes and implements ethical decisions not just on what those decisions 
ultimately must be. Attention to how we determine and execute ethical judgments is 
attention to the process of ethical decision-making. Arthur Walzer and Alan Gross 
explain that ethics that includes this nonfoundational dialogic approach promotes “a 
sincere effort to discover the best reasons for assent or dissent” (428, emphasis added). 
The dialogic portion of contextual foundational ethics allows the communicator to 
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collaborate with others in her discourse community and to discern and evaluate their 
needs and values, using them to critique and enhance her own ethical judgments.  
This dialogic approach to the process of ethical decision-making works well in 
contextual foundational ethics. As Markel explains, the communicator consults with 
others to uncover the ethical needs and values that might come into play in a given 
situation. She uses them to evaluate her own, personal ethic and to determine the 
precedence of ethical concerns. Using the input of others in her discourse community and 
her own convictions, the communicator can then fulfill whatever foundational ethical 
demands are most pressing. This process of inquiry forces the communicator to engage in 
dialogically ethical means to achieve foundationally ethical ends. It is not enough for her 
end result to be ethical. The path that she uses to achieve it must also be ethical, 
considering the needs and values of others as fully as possible in order to discover which 
ethical issues are most critical and where there are problems in certain ideas and actions.  
As Gregory Clark explains, cooperation is “the fundamental principle that guides 
this process [of dialogic ethics]” (“Ethics” 193). When the communicator invites others 
to participate in the ethical decision-making process, she encourages cooperation with 
them but does not demand consensus among them. Naturally, not every member of the 
discourse community will want or be able to cooperate in the communicator’s ethical 
deliberations or decisions. However, by encouraging others to express their opinions and 
values, the communicator opens the pathway to cooperation: “a process of collaboration 
through which people negotiate the knowledge and actions that will support their 
  
128
 
individual as well as their collective interests” (“Ethics” 193). This cooperation is the 
process through which the communicator begins to deliberate ethical problems. Thus, in 
many ways, dialogic ethics can work in contextual foundational ethics to help the 
communicator focus on ethical processes as well as products.  
How the Challenger incident could reflect foundational ethics that depends 
too heavily on ends. Some of the communications concerning the dangers of the charred 
O-rings seem to have striven for a truthful exposition of the facts. Although many of 
these communications admittedly were “not in any way untruthful” (Winsor 105), they 
did not accurately convey the dangers of the O-rings to the reader. Perhaps we can find a 
partial explanation for this problem in a foundational ethic that privileged the end result 
of a truthful communication over a truthful process of negotiation with others in the 
discourse community. 
Dorothy Winsor examines two memos written by MTI engineers, one of which 
gave “just the facts, providing little interpretation” (105). (See also Riley.) This second 
memo, composed by Brian Russell, was “adamantly objective” (105). For example, in 
addressing the issue of whether or not a second O-ring would seal if the first one failed 
because of cool temperatures, Russell wrote, “At 100°F the [O]-ring maintained contact. 
At 75°F the [O]-ring lost contact for 2.4 seconds. At 50°F the [O]-ring did not re-
establish contact in ten minutes at which time the test was terminated. The conclusion is 
that secondary sealing capability in the SRM filed joint cannot be guaranteed” (qtd. in 
Winsor 105). If Russell was striving for an ethical, truthful end product, he undoubtedly 
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achieved his goal. No one examining the Challenger explosion contends that 
Russell’s memo was dishonest. 
However, as Dorothy Winsor explains, in spite of its truthfulness, the memo did 
not accurately convey the danger of the O-rings. One NASA official claimed that no one 
who read the memo understood its implications: “There were a whole lot of people who 
weren’t smart enough to look behind the veil [of indirectness in the memo] and say, ‘Gee, 
I wonder what this means’” (qtd. in Winsor 105). Although the memo was honest, it did 
not appear to communicate its intent honestly. What Russell seemingly failed to 
appreciate was that his version of the truth might not correspond with his audience’s. 
What was “important and problematic…was the interpretation or meaning of this 
charring and what should be done in light of it” (Dombrowski, “Challenger” 105). It was 
the process of interpretation that prevented understanding, and that interpretation is 
socially constructed and therefore requires a social, dialogic approach to the problem. 
It appears that what Russell’s memo lacked was an understanding of the 
audience’s needs and processes of interpretation, knowledge that could have been more 
readily available if Russell had more fully implemented dialogic ethics. This 
nonfoundational approach would have required Russell to interact with his audience to 
determine their needs and values. He would have had to engage in a process of ethically 
judging and incorporating (if need be) those other values into his ethical decision-making 
process. 
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If Russell’s primary ethical focus was on the end product (objective truth), he 
might not have fully examined the processes through which he should achieve that truth. 
Should he have also used Kantian ethics to universalize his standard of truth? Did his 
version of truth correspond with others’? Did his honest communication truthfully 
convey what it was meant to, or did it fall short of the readers’ expectations of what truth 
should be and what form it should take?  
How contextual foundational ethics could have alleviated this problem. 
Contextual foundational ethics might have answered some of these questions. Whereas it 
seems that Russell was striving for an objectively truthful document as his ultimate 
ethical goal, contextual foundational ethics could have reminded him that he needed an 
ethical method of inquiry leading up to that goal. First, using contextual foundational 
ethics, Russell could have employed Kantian ethics, a deontological approach that 
necessitates examining processes as well as products. Using the categorical imperative, 
Russell might have asked himself, “Can I wish that my actions in creating this truthful 
document be used in every similar situation?” Most likely, he would have insisted that 
truthfulness is important. However, he might also have asked himself, “Can I wish that an 
‘adamantly objective’ document be used in every similar situation?” He might have 
looked at his unique position to make recommendations and realized that in similar 
situations, the type of document and language that he would want universalized would be 
those which balanced objective data with clear recommendations. He would not have had 
to sacrifice truthfulness, but by using Kantian ethics as his primary foundational ethic, 
  
131
 
Russell might have been more willing to make explicit recommendations against the 
flight.  
Furthermore, contextual foundational ethics could have offered communicators a 
more complete process of ethical negotiation. Contextual foundational ethics demands 
that the communicator acknowledge that there is no one “correct” end; instead, there are 
ends that are “tentative, incomplete, and inadequate” (Markel 293). Since the end results 
are hardly ever complete in themselves, then, the communicator must  
carry out the decision-making process in a communicative [dialogic] ethics 
framework….He will abandon one line of inquiry and start another…, return 
to a line of inquiry that seemed a dead end, and all of a sudden it will yield a 
new insight. He will resolve the problem, then realize significant 
shortcomings in his solution. Markel 293 
She must be aware constantly that her ethical decisions are not final but need to be 
reexamined and refined continually. To do so, the communicator must understand the 
values of others, using them to appraise and polish her ethical resolutions.  
Thus, the communicator needs a dialogic ethical framework (which describes 
ethical processes) as well as a foundational one (which prescribes ethical products). She 
must be able to work with others in her discourse community to ensure that she is not 
considering only her own values and unnecessarily excluding the values of others. When 
she and her discourse community agree on certain ethical ends, the communicator must 
survey her audience to determine the best means of creating and presenting that end. 
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Using this dialogic approach Russell might have collaborated with others to 
determine what their needs and values were. He might have found that the NASA 
manager to whom he was writing his memo valued truthful recommendations over 
truthful objectivity. Then, Russell could have revised his memo to correspond with the 
manager’s expectations of truth. For example, Russell might have found that he needed to 
explicitly state recommendations for the NASA managers because they did not value or 
understand his objective data as he did. With this knowledge, Russell might have 
concluded his memo by stating, “We do not recommend that you launch the shuttle in 
temperatures of 75° or less because the O-rings did not completely seal at these 
temperatures.” This declaration would not have sacrificed the truthful end that Russell 
seems to have desired. However, it might have more completely reflected and 
incorporated the needs of NASA personnel, which might have been discernible in a 
dialogic framework. It would have more fully implemented a process of negotiating 
needs and values as well as methods of manifesting those values. In short, it would have 
been a more contextual foundational approach to ethics, and it might have granted 
Russell a more complete ethical approach to his memo. 
 
Alleviating Nonfoundational Ethics’ Impracticality  
Finally, nonfoundational ethics can be unrealistic and sometimes impossible for 
the communicator to employ. For example, dialogic ethics demands socially constructed 
values, but social consensus can be impossible, and people in positions of authority 
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sometimes will not allow for a genuinely dialogic ethics. (See Chapter Four.) Hence, 
at times communicators simply cannot implement truly nonfoundational ethics.  
One of the flaws that makes dialogic ethics impractical is its requirement that 
ethical decisions incorporate “Necessary democratic procedures [such as] unrestricted 
debate and discussion” (Johannessen, Ethics 25). Dialogic ethics demands that the 
communicator attempt to allow every voice interested in the discussion to express itself. 
It is generally impossible, though, for a communicator to consider every opinion that 
might possibly be related to an ethical problem. Moreover, as Mike Markel warns, “The 
advice that we negotiate among competing viewpoints presumes that all those viewpoints 
are reasonable” (“A Case” 290). Every voice in a discussion might not warrant equal 
consideration, and others might warrant more. Since the communicator cannot consider 
every possible opinion and since all opinions may not be equally reasonable, the 
communicator must know how to determine which opinions to negotiate with fully. 
Whereas nonfoundational ethics generally does not offer guidelines for the 
communicator’s discretion, contextual foundational ethics can. 
Contextual foundational ethics can help the communicator understand what to do 
when dialogic ethics falls short of its ideal; it can help the communicator ascertain which 
values to consider most fully in such a situation. Mike Markel concedes that ideally his 
ethical approach would include “the strictures of…[dialogic] ethics: inclusion of all 
stakeholders, as well as free, open, and uncoerced communication” (293). However, he 
admits that “these strictures are unattainable in most cases” (293). Instead, he urges the 
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communicator to realize the necessary shortcomings of dialogic ethics but to try 
nevertheless to implement it as fully as possible in any given rhetorical situation.  
For example, Markel encourages the communicator to meet with people who 
might be affected by the decision and in more significant situations to form focus groups 
to study the implications of ethical decisions—all in order to understand others’ input. 
Still, he admonishes the communicator to understand that this line of inquiry will not 
yield solid and always satisfying answers (293). In fact, this method will produce 
“tentative, incomplete, and inadequate answers” (293). The communicator cannot address 
and fully consider every available ethical opinion, especially given the timelines in which 
technical communicators must work. It offers the communicator a means of attempting to 
access as many viewpoints as possible. As Markel concludes, although “Open, uncoerced 
discussion involving questions of value is flawed,…it is the best way to try to achieve 
ethically informed consensus” (295). Although contextual foundational ethics admits that 
dialogic ethics is impractical, it nonetheless invites the communicator to employ dialogic 
ethics as fully as possible while also understanding its limitations. 
Also helping to alleviate the impracticality of nonfoundational ethics, contextual 
foundational ethics does not require complete consensus within the discourse community. 
It recognizes some values as irreconcilable with others. For example, it does not ask the 
communicator to achieve a social ethos that reflects society’s values. Such a consensus is 
impossible because of the myriad needs and beliefs in any group or society. When Mike 
Markel calls for an “ethically informed consensus” through dialogic ethics, he is not 
  
135
 
demanding unanimity of values. Instead, he is asking for an ethical consensus as 
opposed to dissensus (295). He promotes an ethical process of collaboration (not 
estrangement) that involves as many people as possible in deciding and implementing 
foundational values such as Kantian ethics. (See also Thomas and Olsen 39.) Engaging in 
the process of creating consensus means acknowledging and dealing with dissent.  
When dissent is overwhelming, though, how does the communicator know which 
opinion to privilege? She must select among the competing voices, a matter that 
nonfoundational ethics generally does not address. However, contextual foundational 
ethics does. Contextual foundational ethics attempts to help the communicator choose 
which voices are most suitable for her negotiations. It offers a guideline for selecting the 
most valid viewpoints when it insists that the communicator ask herself questions of 
Kantian rights.  
After the communicator has collaborated with others to glean their ethical input, 
she attempts to implement it through Kantian ethics. The communicator then can judge 
these social values, asking herself, “If I implement this particular ethical solution, can I 
desire that it would become a universal law?” and “Will this solution treat other humans 
as ends themselves and not means to ends?” If the communicator cannot answer “Yes” to 
both of these questions, then the values and solutions that she is examining do not fully 
reflect Kantian ethics. As a result, they probably are not fully ethical solutions. If the 
communicator can answer “Yes” to both questions, the ethical settlement she is exploring 
more completely reflects Kantian ethics. The communicator can then consider more 
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thoroughly the options that best manifest the categorical imperative. In this way, 
contextual foundational ethics can help the communicator to determine which voices 
demand her most careful attention.  
Admittedly, this process is not perfect. Some very unethical actions could appear 
to pass the test of Kant’s categorical imperative, and some of the most ethical options 
available could appear to fail it. However, the communicator must remember that 
contextual foundational ethics is a “flexible, fluid, and recursive” process (Markel 293); it 
demands that the communicator use the insight of others in her discourse community to 
critique and refine her own ability to make ethical decisions. Although the technical 
communicator will usually be limited in the amount of time that she can contribute to 
negotiating, judging, and renegotiating her ethical decisions, simply attempting to do so 
can help her become more ethically aware and a better ethical decision-maker. 
 How the Challenger incident could reflect nonfoundational ethics that is not 
practical. In dialogic ethics, deference to others is vitally important in order to fully 
recognize the value of each person and her opinions. It is a convention supported by both 
dialogic ethics’ insistence upon allowing each individual to express herself fully and 
professional ethics’ mandate to treat others with respect. However, the same politeness 
that is important to dialogic ethics can actually make that ethic impossible and can hurt 
the ethical decision-making process.  
Patrick Moore explains that in some cases MTI engineers used politeness 
irresponsibly. When testifying before the Presidential Commission investigating the 
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shuttle explosion, one engineer admitted, “‘I never used the words ‘no go’ for launch. 
I did use the words that we cannot prove it is safe’” (qtd. in Moore 285). Seemingly, the 
engineer wanted to show deference to the NASA managers. He did not want to tell them 
what they must do with their flight, nor did he want to privilege his own conclusions over 
theirs. He simply stated what he saw to be the facts of the case and assumed that the 
managers’ own values and ethical awareness would enable them to do with that 
information what they needed. This engineer did not seem to believe that it was his place 
to force his viewpoints upon the managers.  
According to Moore, it was politeness that likely caused this engineer not to tell 
NASA unequivocally to delay the flight. Moore concludes that “if a speaker is polite to a 
hearer, say by minimizing a concern, when the speaker does not agree with what the 
hearer is doing, then—if the hearer is so disposed—the hearer may interpret the speaker’s 
politeness as meaning it is okay to do it” (289). In other words, when politely allowing 
every voice to be heard in the process of ethical decision-making, the communicator may 
not want to censor any voices. In doing so, though, she may send the message that she 
agrees with each opinion, even if some of those values violate Kantian ethics. In such 
instances, the social convention of politeness can actually impede the content of the 
message. If politeness covers up a message, it becomes a primary motivating factor—
even at the expense of other factors, such as foundational ethical needs. Perhaps the 
engineer who politely refused to say “no-go” wanted to give NASA the ability to form its 
own opinion on the matter; he did not want to mandate his decisions to it. However, by 
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allowing such politeness to color the content of his message, that engineer may have 
unintentionally conveyed to the NASA managers that an opinion to proceed with the 
flight was a legitimate one. As the Challenger disaster showed, though, that one 
particular viewpoint was not as legitimate as the opinion to delay the flight.  
How contextual foundational ethics could have alleviated this problem. 
Contextual foundational ethics might have been able to help mitigate this problem, 
though. Contextual ethics acknowledges that the communicator cannot heed every single 
voice in the discourse community. Moreover, it admits that some voices and values are 
more reasonable than others. To help the communicator find and fully negotiate with the 
most reasonable opinions, contextual foundational ethics offers guidelines from Kantian 
ethics to judge the competing social views: “Is this ethical opinion one that should be 
universalized?” and “Does this opinion treat humans as ends rather than means to ends?” 
Using Kantian ethics, the polite MTI engineer might have noticed that in his 
ethical dilemma, the values of the NASA managers did not fully reflect Kantian ethics. If 
the managers privileged timeliness, for example, they might have based their decision to 
proceed with the flight on that value. If the MTI engineer examined this value based on 
Kantian ethics, though, he might have found that it did not reflect the categorical 
imperative as fully as the opinion to delay the flight. He might have questioned the value 
of timeliness: “Could I wish that everyone in my situation proceed with the launch in 
favor of timeliness?” However, he might have found that he would not want this situation 
universalized. For example, if he himself were one of the seven astronauts in the 
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Challenger, he might not have wanted to value timeliness so highly. As a result, the 
engineer might have realized that the value of timeliness was not fully congruent with 
Kantian ethics. With this knowledge, the engineer might have been more assertive with 
his own determinations and less polite toward the managers. By using foundational 
Kantian ethics, the communicator would have had to acknowledge that the value of the 
decision lie not just in the social valuation of the exigencies in a particular situation—
such as the managers’ need to proceed with the flight because of past delays. He would 
have had to ask whether he would admit the possibility of proceeding with a questionable 
flight if time and money were not such pressing factors.  
More importantly, the managers’ values of timeliness and cost-effectiveness did 
not fulfill the second mandate of the categorical imperative: to treat humans as ends in 
themselves (Markel “A Case” 291). The managers wanted the flight to proceed on the 
January date and did not want to incur the expenses of delaying it again. Because their 
primary values were probably timeliness and cost-effectiveness, the managers perhaps 
did not fully consider the astronauts as ends in themselves. Instead, the managers’ values 
used the astronauts as means to an end—an on-schedule flight. The astronauts were tools 
for achieving that end more so than they were individuals whose lives could possibly be 
in danger.  
In each situation, the MTI engineer might have concluded that, from a Kantian 
perspective, a decision to proceed with the flight was less ethical than a decision to delay. 
Once he had determined that proceeding with the flight was less ethical, he could have 
  
140
 
given it less consideration; he might have been more willing to balance the politeness 
demanded by dialogic ethics with his ethical obligation to implement Kantian ethics as 
fully as possible. He might have said “no go.” 
 
Conclusion 
As the examples from the space shuttle Challenger disaster show, contextual 
foundational ethics could possibly offer a more complete ethics in technical 
communication. Contextual foundational ethics forces the communicator to understand 
that ethics is a complex matter that is never fully resolved. Instead, the communicator 
must try to implement foundational ethics as fully as possible within the boundaries of 
her discourse community. This never-ending process of ethics requires aspects of both 
foundational and nonfoundational ethics, and—perhaps most importantly—a 
commitment from the communicator to employ these ethical approaches as fully as 
possible.  
Communicators must also remember, though, that contextual foundational ethics 
is by no means an ethical cure-all. In fact, in some situations communicators may find 
that either a foundational or nonfoundational approach to an ethical dilemma serves them 
better than contextual foundational ethics. However, contextual foundational ethics can 
help alleviate some of the problems in foundational and nonfoundational ethics. 
Moreover, since contextual foundational ethics includes aspects of both approaches, it 
isolates neither one. Proponents of both foundational and nonfoundational ethics can find 
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characteristics of their chosen ethical approaches in contextual foundational ethics, 
and therefore they might be willing to accept the middle ground of contextual 
foundational ethics. For these reasons, contextual foundational ethics can perhaps offer a 
more complete ethics for technical communication. 
Perhaps more importantly, though, contextual foundational ethics offers if not a 
fuller, at least another approach to ethics in technical communication. No field, 
especially one as constantly changing as technical communication, can rely on one ethic. 
Therefore, both the field of technical communication and each individual technical 
communicator must commit to a never-ending exploration into ethics, searching not for 
more complete answers but for more thorough questions. We must understand that the 
issue of ethics is never resolved and that each new ethical dilemma offers us another 
opportunity to refine our ethical thinking. Ultimately, perhaps the most significant 
contribution that studies of ethics offer us is not a final answer but a renewed devotion to 
the tireless search for the good that we should do and the right we should desire. 
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